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CATEGORICAL NONUNIFORMITY
Sheldon A. Evans*
The categorical approach, which is a method federal courts use to
‘categorize’ which state law criminal convictions can trigger federal
sanctions, is one of the most impactful yet misunderstood legal doctrines
in criminal and immigration law. For thousands of criminal offenders,
the categorical approach determines whether a previous state law
conviction—as deﬁned by the legal elements of the crime—sufficiently
matches the elements of the federal crime counterpart that justiﬁes
imposing harsh federal sentencing enhancements or even deportation for
noncitizens. One of the normative goals courts have invoked to uphold
this elements-based categorical approach is that it produces nationwide
uniformity. Ironically, however, the categorical approach produces the
opposite. By examining the categorical approach in different contexts,
this Article shows that relying on state criminal elements has produced
nonuniformity due to the variations of state law.
While scholars are increasingly weighing in, this Article contributes
to the literature by applying different theories of uniformity that juxtapose
the ideals of nationwide uniformity with the potential beneﬁts of
nonuniformity. This novel analysis supports several paths forward,
dictated by policy preferences. First, if uniformity is to be prioritized, the
elements-based categorical approach must be fundamentally redesigned
to properly accomplish this goal. Second, uniformity can be responsibly
abandoned by justifying the elements-based categorical approach under
a different theoretical framework that acknowledges the beneﬁts of state
variation. Finally, other options might prove effective to tailor the
categorical approach to the policy goals unique to different statutes, and
the possible abolition of the categorical approach altogether.
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INTRODUCTION
The categorical approach is a method of ‘categorizing’ which state
criminal convictions can trigger federal sanctions.1 But lurking underneath this simple encapsulation of the categorical approach lies a
complex, muddled, and perplexing jurisprudence2 that has broad impacts
1. See United States v. Garcia-Santana, 774 F.3d 528, 539 (9th Cir. 2014) (stating that
the categorical approach helps courts assess “[w]hat set of prior state and federal criminal
convictions . . . Congress mean[t] to encompass in a provision assigning [sanctions] to such
previous convictions”). For this Article’s deﬁnition of “sanctions,” see infra note 4.
2. See, e.g., Chambers v. United States, 555 U.S. 122, 126 (2009) (“This categorical
approach requires courts to choose the right category. And sometimes the choice is not
obvious.”).
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in the disparate imposition of federal criminal sentencing enhancements
and immigration deportations.3 When Congress wrote a number of federal
statutes governing the imposition of such harsh sanctions4—such as
criminal sentencing enhancements under the Armed Career Criminal Act
(ACCA)5 or deportation under the Immigration and Nationality Act
(INA)6—it expressly allowed for state criminal convictions of certain
crimes it enumerated in the statutes (such as murder, rape, and burglary)
to serve as predicates to trigger these federal sanctions at a later time.7 The
categorical approach purports to do this through an elements-based test;
it compares the state criminal elements from an offender’s prior state
criminal conviction to the federal elements of the crime enumerated in
the statute.8 By way of example, courts utilize the categorical approach to
determine if a state law’s version of murder, rape, or burglary—as deﬁned by
that state’s criminal elements—qualify under what Congress intended
when it enumerated murder, rape, and burglary in the respective federal
statute.9 If the state criminal elements match or criminalize narrower
conduct than the federal elements, then the state criminal conviction can
serve as a predicate to impose the federal sanction.10
For over a century,11 courts have used the categorical approach to
impact thousands of people every year,12 justifying the elements-based
3. See infra notes 106–115, 137–146 and accompanying text.
4. This Article refers to federal criminal and civil penalties as sanctions because this
term encompasses both criminal sentencing enhancements and civil immigration
deportations. But see Gabriel J. Chin, Illegal Entry as Crime, Deportation as Punishment:
Immigration Status and the Criminal Process, 58 UCLA L. Rev. 1417, 1441–51 (2011)
(arguing that deportation constitutes quasi-punishment).
5. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) (2018).
6. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101–1537 (2018).
7. See, e.g., id. § 1101(a)(43) (applying convictions under either “Federal or State
law” to aggravated felonies); Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 588–89 (1990)
(acknowledging that the ACCA could be triggered by state law convictions).
8. See Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243, 2248–49 (2016) (noting that, when
applying the categorical approach, courts “focus solely on whether the elements of the
crime of conviction sufficiently match the elements of [the crime], while ignoring the
particular facts of the case”).
9. See, e.g., id.
10. See id. (explaining that, in the context of burglary, a federal conviction can be
triggered by a state conviction if the state crime’s elements are “the same as, or narrower
than, those of” the federal crime).
11. See infra notes 121–124 and accompanying text.
12. See Katherine Witsman, DHS, Annual Report: Immigration Enforcement
Actions: 2017, at 12 tbl.6 (2019), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/
enforcement_actions_2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/S56S-M7VT] (stating that 295,364
noncitizens with criminal records were deported in 2017—down from 333,592 in 2016,
326,406 in 2015, and over 400,000 recorded annually between 2012 and 2014). These ﬁgures
include all deportations on the basis of criminal convictions, without specifying deportations
based alone on aggravated felony determinations. Id.; see also Jessica A. Roth, The
Divisibility of Crime, 64 Duke L.J. Online 95, 97 n.7 (2015) (ﬁnding that “approximately
600 criminal defendants per year have been sentenced as Armed Career Criminals” under
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approach as one that would promote nationwide uniformity across all
jurisdictions,13 without relying on the different “technical deﬁnitions and
labels” or the “vagaries of state law.”14 But the categorical approach’s reliance on state criminal elements has proven instead to be “an impediment
to uniformity.”15 Therefore, because the categorical approach consistently
results in disparities that are triggered by the very technicalities and
differences in state law it promised to ignore, it has come time for its
reconsideration.
The nonuniformity of the categorical approach can be told as a tale
of two jurisdictions. Compare the case of Arthur Taylor to that of Richard
Mathis; both offenders were convicted of second-degree burglary, but
Taylor was convicted under Missouri law and Mathis was convicted under
Iowa law.16 The factual evidence preserved in each offender’s state court
proceeding showed that both men admitted to similar conduct of having
burgled buildings.17 Some years later, both Taylor and Mathis emerged on
the radar of federal law enforcement because they both, as persons
the ACCA); How Many Hundreds (or Thousands?) of ACCA Prisoners Could Be Impacted by
a Big Ruling in Johnson?, Sent’g L. & Pol’y (June 13, 2015), http://sentencing.typepad.com/
sentencing_law_and_policy/2015/06/how-many-hundreds-or-thousands-of-acca-prisonerscould-be-impacted-by-a-big-ruling-in-johnson.html [https://perma.cc/6BN9-SK5M] (estimating that over 7,000 people are currently serving enhanced ACCA sentences).
13. See Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 590 (1990) (emphasizing uniform
deﬁnitions of predicate crimes); United States v. Mayer, 560 F.3d 948, 952 (9th Cir. 2009)
(Kozinski, J., dissenting) (explaining the uniformity virtues of the categorical approach);
United States ex rel. Mylius v. Uhl, 210 F. 860, 862 (2d Cir. 1914) (“[T]he rule which
conﬁnes the proof of the nature of the offense to the judgment is clearly in the interest of
a uniform . . . administration of the law . . . .”); Laura Jean Eichten, Comment, A Felony, I
Presume? 21 USC § 841(b)’s Mitigating Provision and the Categorical Approach in
Immigration Proceedings, 79 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1093, 1136 (2012) (“A key goal of the
categorical approach has always been the uniform administration of the law.”). Courts have
also justiﬁed using the categorical approach on the basis that it serves judicial economy, but
that notion has been challenged. See Mayer, 560 F.3d at 952 (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (“A
great virtue of the categorical approach has been its consistency across doctrinal areas.”);
Mylius, 210 F. at 862 (claiming that the categorical approach promotes “efficient
administration of the law”); see also infra notes 164–172 and accompanying text.
14. Taylor, 495 U.S. at 588, 590.
15. United States v. Chapman, 866 F.3d 129, 137 (3d Cir. 2017) (Jordan, J.,
concurring); see also Cristina M. Rodríguez, Uniformity and Integrity in Immigration Law:
Lessons from the Decisions of Justice (and Judge) Sotomayor, 123 Yale L.J. Forum 499, 503–
04 (2014) [hereinafter Rodríguez, Uniformity and Integrity in Immigration Law]
(describing the categorical approach as a “design [that] thwarts uniformity, the courts’ best
efforts notwithstanding”).
16. See Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243, 2250 (2016); Taylor, 495 U.S. at 578.
Compare Mo. Rev. Stat. § 560.045 (1969) (current version at Mo. Ann. Stat. § 569.170 (West
2017)) (breaking and entering a dwelling house), with Iowa Code § 713.1 (1989) (burgling
an occupied structure).
17. See United States v. Mathis, 786 F.3d 1068, 1075 (8th Cir. 2015) (ﬁnding that two
of Mathis’s previous burglary convictions were for burgling garages), rev’d, 136 S. Ct. 2243;
United States v. Taylor, 932 F.2d 703, 707 (8th Cir. 1991) (ﬁnding that Taylor’s previous
burglary convictions were for burgling buildings, including a service station shop).
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convicted of felonies, illegally possessed a ﬁrearm in violation of federal
law.18 In these later federal court proceedings, federal prosecutors
pursued sentencing enhancements under the ACCA based on the
previous state burglary convictions.19 But even dealing with such similar
criminal conduct, the Supreme Court came to different conclusions under
the categorical approach. Whereas the Court held that Missouri’s burglary
statute can trigger the federal sanction, it separately held that Iowa’s
burglary statute cannot.20 Because of the minor differences in how these
two sister states drafted their respective burglary statutes, the Court
applied the categorical approach differently to accommodate these
differences in state law. This explains how Mathis, who had the “luck”21 of
committing criminal conduct in Iowa, could enjoy a sentencing windfall22
whereas Taylor, committing similar criminal conduct across a northern
border in Missouri, was not so lucky.23 Two offenders who admitted to
committing similar criminal conduct of burgling different buildings at the
state-proceeding stage were treated differently by federal courts imposing
sanctions at the federal-proceeding phase because of the differences in
state law. And the disparate impact was monumental. The nonuniformity
of the categorical approach can mean the difference between adding
several years behind bars or receiving a lesser sentence, or even the
difference between staying in the country or being deported.24
This illustrates the incompatibility between an elements-based
categorical approach and nationwide uniformity. Any state-to-federal
sanctioning regime that relies so heavily on state criminal elements will
struggle to achieve nationwide uniformity. The federal sanctions applied
at a later date will always be wholly dependent on the differences between
various state laws. Any promise or commitment that the courts have made
to establish nationwide uniformity has proven to be illusory in practice.25
18. See Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2250; Taylor, 495 U.S. at 578.
19. See Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2246; Taylor, 495 U.S. at 579.
20. See Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2257; Taylor, 495 U.S. at 602.
21. See Cazarez-Gutierrez v. Ashcroft, 382 F.3d 905, 917 (9th Cir. 2004) (characterizing
defendants as having been “lucky enough” to commit a crime in a more lenient state that
results in less serious consequences under the categorical approach).
22. See United States v. Doctor, 842 F.3d 306, 314, 316 (4th Cir. 2016) (Wilkinson, J.,
concurring) (describing the categorical approach as creating sentencing windfalls); Caleb
E. Mason & Scott M. Lesowitz, A Rational Post-Booker Proposal for Reform of Federal
Sentencing Enhancements for Prior Convictions, 31 N. Ill. U. L. Rev. 339, 368–70 (2011)
(arguing that differences in state law can result in offenders avoiding otherwise prescribed
punishment under the categorical approach). But see Evan Tsen Lee, Mathis v. U.S. and the
Future of the Categorical Approach, 101 Minn. L. Rev. Headnotes 263, 272–76 (2016)
[hereinafter Lee, The Future of the Categorical Approach] (arguing against the windfall
logic).
23. See Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2260–61 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (highlighting similarities
between the Missouri statute in Taylor and the Iowa statute in Mathis, and criticizing the
different applications of the categorical approach between cases).
24. See infra notes 106–115, 137–146 and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 99–110, 137–146 and accompanying text.
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As a result, courts have fallen into the very trap they sought to avoid: The
different technicalities and vagaries of state law govern the imposition of
federal sanctions.26
This problem arises, in part, because the courts’ broken promises are
premised on the semantic imprecision of the ambiguous ideal of
“uniformity.” The irony of the term “uniformity” is that it is not uniform.
It enjoys a diversity of meanings, some of which can lead down different
policy paths. This Article focuses on two such meanings most commonly
used by the courts to justify the categorical approach. First is uniformity in
terms of application. This type of uniformity ensures that the same rule,
or set of rules, is applied the same way to all cases within applicable
boundaries.27 Second is uniformity in terms of outcomes. This uniformity
ensures that similar sanctions are meted out for similar cases.28 So whereas
uniformity of application is more concerned with similar means, uniformity
of outcomes is more concerned with similar ends. While these uniformities
are distinct in theory, they often share overlapping principles and goals in
practice when utilized to build legitimacy in legal regimes.29
By recognizing these distinct uniformities, this Article argues that the
elements-based categorical approach fails both standards because of its
dependence on state law. Not only do differences in state criminal

26. See Wayne A. Logan, Contingent Constitutionalism: State and Local Criminal Laws
and the Applicability of Federal Constitutional Rights, 51 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 143, 145–47
(2009) [hereinafter Logan, Contingent Constitutionalism] (discussing the national
nonuniformity of federal constitutional rights in criminal procedure due to differences in
state law); see also Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 24, 1787), in The
Founders’ Constitution 644, 646 (Phillip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987) (stating
that “mutability” of state laws represented a “serious evil”).
27. See, e.g., United States v. Torres, 923 F.3d 420, 424–25 (5th Cir. 2019) (citing the
uniform application across different areas of law); Amos v. Lynch, 790 F.3d 512, 518 (4th
Cir. 2015) (citing Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 590–91 (1990)) (stating that the
categorical “approach allows federal laws to be applied uniformly”); Rodríguez, Uniformity
and Integrity in Immigration Law, supra note 15, at 506 (“[T]he best courts can do in their
oversight . . . is to promote a kind of consistency in legal interpretation to guide law
enforcement and administration. By consistency, I mean a predictable approach to
resolving immigration law questions that pushes administrative actors to adhere to
consistent legal standards . . . .”); see also 6 Charles Gordon, Stanley Mailman, Stephen YaleLoehr & Ronald Y. Wada, Immigration Law and Procedure § 71.05[2][b] (Matthew Bender
& Co., Inc. rev. ed. 2013) (highlighting the importance of employing a “uniform rule” to
determine which state convictions qualify as aggravated felonies).
28. See, e.g., Gerbier v. Holmes, 280 F.3d 297, 311–12 (3d Cir. 2002) (stating “that
permanent resident aliens who are in like circumstances, but for irrelevant and fortuitous
factors, [should] be treated in a like manner” (quoting Francis v. Immigr. & Naturalization
Serv., 532 F.2d 268, 273 (2d Cir. 1976))); Rebecca Sharpless, Clear and Simple Deportation
Rules for Crimes: Why We Need Them and Why It’s Hard to Get Them, 92 Denv. U. L. Rev.
933, 943 (2015) [hereinafter Sharpless, Deportation Rules] (noting that “[t]he categorical
analysis rests on the bedrock principle[] that fairness requires that immigrants convicted of
the same offenses be treated uniformly”).
29. See infra notes 188–194 and accompanying text.
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elements trigger different applications of the categorical approach,30 but
they also trigger different outcomes among otherwise similar offenses.31 The
categorical approach has failed to meet the very metric that courts
developed it to achieve.
The complexities of navigating the nonuniformity of the categorical
approach have demanded more of the Supreme Court’s docket in recent
years in its attempt to clarify these complications; the Court has decided
over twenty such cases in the past thirteen years,32 with two more cases
pending during this 2020–2021 Term alone.33 Increasingly, lower court
judges have voiced complaints that the categorical approach has become
one of the most judicially taxing issues burdening the federal bench.34 It
comes as no surprise, then, that there has also been a sharp increase in
scholarly interest both praising the merits of the categorical approach35
and/or proposing solutions to ﬁx what has become nearly unworkable.36

30. See infra section II.A.
31. See infra section II.B.
32. See Shular v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 779, 787 (2020); United States v. Davis, 139
S. Ct. 2319, 2336 (2019); Quarles v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 1872, 1880 (2019); Stokeling v.
United States, 139 S. Ct. 544, 555 (2019); United States v. Stitt, 139 S. Ct. 399, 407–08 (2018);
Beckles v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 886, 897 (2017); Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243,
2257 (2016); Welch v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1257, 1268 (2016); Johnson v. United States,
135 S. Ct. 2551, 2563 (2015); United States v. Castleman, 572 U.S. 157, 171 (2014);
Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254, 277–78 (2013); Moncrieffe v. Holder, 569 U.S. 184,
190 (2013); Sykes v. United States, 564 U.S. 1, 15–16 (2011); McNeill v. United States, 563
U.S. 816, 823 (2011); Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133, 145 (2010); Nijhawan v.
Holder, 557 U.S. 29, 41–43 (2009); Chambers v. United States, 555 U.S. 122, 130 (2009);
United States v. Rodriquez, 553 U.S. 377, 393 (2008); Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137,
148 (2008); Logan v. United States, 552 U.S. 23, 37 (2007); James v. United States, 550 U.S.
192, 208–09 (2007).
33. See United States v. Borden, 769 F. App’x 266 (6th Cir. 2019), cert. granted, 140
S. Ct. 1262 (Mar. 2, 2020) (No. 19-5410) (mem.) (addressing the application of the ACCA
under the categorical approach to mens rea elements); Perieda v. Barr, 916 F.3d 1128 (8th
Cir. 2019), cert. granted, 140 S. Ct. 680 (Dec. 18, 2019) (No. 19-438) (mem.) (addressing
whether a criminal attempt conviction qualiﬁes as a deportable crime under categorical
approach).
34. See infra notes 167–173 and accompanying text.
35. See, e.g., Jennifer Lee Koh, The Whole Better than the Sum: A Case for the
Categorical Approach to Determining the Immigration Consequences of Crime, 26 Geo.
Immigr. L.J. 257, 295–99 (2012) [hereinafter Koh, The Whole Better than the Sum]
(arguing the beneﬁts of the categorical approach include a clear doctrine and judicial
efficiency); Rebecca Sharpless, Toward a True Categorical Elements Test: Taylor and the
Categorical Analysis of Crimes in Immigration Law, 62 U. Mia. L. Rev. 979, 1031–34 (2008)
[hereinafter Sharpless, Toward a True Categorical Elements Test] (same); see also Amit
Jain & Phillip Dane Warren, An Ode to the Categorical Approach, 67 UCLA L. Rev.
Discourse 132, 150 (2019) (arguing the merits of uniformity produced by the categorical
approach); Fatma Marouf, A Particularly Serious Exception to the Categorical Approach,
97 B.U. L. Rev. 1427, 1470 (2017) (same).
36. See, e.g., Rachel E. Barkow, Categorical Mistakes: The Flawed Framework of the
Armed Career Criminal Act and Mandatory Minimum Sentencing, 133 Harv. L. Rev. 200,
207–09 (2019) [hereinafter Barkow, Categorical Mistakes] (arguing that Congress’s
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This Article contributes a novel analysis to the literature on the
categorical approach by juxtaposing the theoretical framework of
nationwide uniformity with the political ideals of a federalist system of
government. Building from the costs and beneﬁts of each, the Article
argues that there are unique paths forward that would restructure the
categorical approach to solve its problem of nonuniformity. The ﬁrst path
prioritizes nationwide uniformity as a worthwhile and achievable pursuit.
If either uniformity of application or outcomes is to be salvaged, the
categorical approach must be redesigned to properly accommodate these
uniformities. The most viable option to maximize both uniformities would
be a conduct-based categorical approach. Such an approach would rely on
the underlying criminal conduct of the offender’s state court conviction,
and then determine if such conduct—regardless of whether it was
committed in Missouri or Iowa—would ﬁt within the federal elements of
the enumerated crime.37 By excising reliance on state law criminal
elements, a conduct-based categorical approach will impose sanctions
according to criminal conduct, which would mitigate nonuniformity that
comes with state law variety.38
But there is another path forward, one that recognizes that while a
conduct-based categorical approach holds a greater likelihood of coming
closer to uniformity than the current elements-based approach, it will not
eliminate all disparity. And if perfect uniformity cannot be achieved,39 the
current elements-based categorical approach can be retained, albeit under
a different justiﬁcation. This Article argues that the practical and
theoretical beneﬁts of federalism can serve to justify the disparate
application and outcomes of the elements-based categorical approach.
Embracing the natural differences that arise within a federal system that
accounts for and encourages differences in state law according to the
preferences of that polity would justify the disparate treatment of criminal
offenders who choose to violate the laws of that state, and must then accept
the different costs that come with such state citizenship.
This Article proceeds in Part I by focusing on the ACCA and the INA,
two key areas in which applying the categorical approach has the greatest
statutory design of the ACCA is problematic for incorporating state law, and that Congress
should have instead given discretion to the Sentencing Commission); Sheldon A. Evans,
Punishing Criminals for Their Conduct: A Return to Reason for the Armed Career Criminal
Act, 70 Okla. L. Rev. 623, 649–52 (2018) [hereinafter Evans, Punishing Criminals]
(examining the inconsistencies of basing ACCA sentencing enhancements on state law); Iris
Bennett, Note, The Unconstitutionality of Nonuniform Immigration Consequences of
“Aggravated Felony” Convictions, 74 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1696, 1720–24 (1999) (explaining that
differences between states’ criminal laws lead to discrepancies in the imposition of federal
immigration sanctions).
37. See Evans, Punishing Criminals, supra note 36, at 666–67 (arguing that a conductbased approach would solve nonuniformity between jurisdictions).
38. Id.
39. See Amanda Frost, Overvaluing Uniformity, 94 Va. L. Rev. 1567, 1606 (2008)
(arguing that the detriments of nationwide nonuniformity of federal law are overstated).
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effect on defendants and the doctrine’s development. The examples
illustrate how the differences in states’ criminal statutes trigger different
applications of the categorical approach and, in turn, trigger different
outcomes for similar criminal conduct. Part II serves as the primary
contribution of the Article by examining how the categorical approach
fails to uphold courts’ promises of uniformity. By comparing courts’ logic
with that of the different underpinnings of uniformity in application and
uniformity in outcomes, it becomes nearly impossible to achieve either
uniformity under the current elements-based categorical approach. Part
III presents potential remedies to the categorical approach by exploring
several paths with different views on uniformity. First, if nationwide
uniformity is an achievable goal, this Article argues that the best option is
to transition to a conduct-based categorical approach that removes the
disparities created by differences in state law. Uniformity might also be
achieved with a separate-sovereign system, allowing federal sanctions to be
imposed for only previous federal—not state—convictions. Second, if
nationwide uniformity is to be abandoned, the elements-based categorical
approach can be salvaged, but under the different theoretical and
practical justiﬁcations that may come by embracing the beneﬁts of having
variety in state law under a federal system of government. Embracing
nonuniformity also allows a novel analysis of tailoring the categorical
approach, pursuing different approaches for different statutes to serve the
unique policy goals of each. And ﬁnally, the challenges of salvaging
uniformity, and possibly redesigning the categorical approach, require
consideration of complete abolition of the doctrine altogether.
I. THE CATEGORICAL APPROACH’S UNIFORMITY PROBLEM
“It surprises me that we have arrived at this point, because in theory,
the categorical approach makes a good deal of sense . . . . But what was
ﬁne in theory has sometimes proven to be less so in practice.” 40
The categorical approach is best understood as a method of
‘categorizing’ which state criminal convictions trigger later federal
sanctions.41 The Supreme Court developed the categorical approach as an
attempt to overcome what some had perceived as a problem of statutory
design.42 Consequently, whenever Congress has designed a statute that
40. United States v. Doctor, 842 F.3d 306, 313 (4th Cir. 2016) (Wilkinson, J., concurring).
41. See United States v. Garcia-Santana, 774 F.3d 528, 539 (9th Cir. 2014) (stating that
the categorical approach helps courts assess “[w]hat set of prior state and federal criminal
convictions . . . Congress mean[t] to encompass in a provision assigning [sanctions] to such
previous convictions”).
42. See, e.g., Graham Cnty. Soil & Water Conservation Dist. v. United States ex rel.
Wilson, 545 U.S. 409, 422 (2005) (“Congress could have drafted [§ 1101(a)(43)] with more
precision than it did.”); Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 583–90 (1990) (explaining
the legislative history that the Court used to justify developing the categorical approach);
Barkow, Categorical Mistakes, supra note 36, at 207 (“The blame for this regime falls
squarely on Congress and the statutory framework it elected to adopt.”).
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allowed a state criminal conviction to serve as a predicate for a downstream
federal sanction, courts have utilized the categorical approach in some
form to help categorize these state crimes.43 The sweeping federalization
of criminal law throughout the 1980s and 1990s44 produced many federal
statutes that subscribed to this design,45 which explains why the reach of
the categorical approach is quite vast and “seems to be always enlarging its
territory.”46 Its impact is felt even outside of federal law, with a number of
state courts citing federal precedent when developing and applying their
own parallel versions of the categorical approach in criminal sentencing.47
When writing these statutes, Congress left them vague in certain instances
by enumerating, but not precisely deﬁning, state crimes that qualify as

43. See, e.g., United States v. Mayer, 560 F.3d 948, 951 (9th Cir. 2009) (Kozinski, J.,
dissenting) (noting that courts use the categorical approach to interpret federal sentencing
statutes, federal sentencing guidelines, and immigration statutes).
44. See Sara Sun Beale, Rethinking the Identity and Role of United States Attorneys, 6
Ohio St. J. Crim. L. 369, 392, 399 (2009) (counting nearly 4,000 federal crimes); Kathleen
F. Brickey, Criminal Mischief: The Federalization of American Criminal Law, 46 Hastings
L.J. 1135, 1137–45 (1995) (providing a historical overview of federal regulation of crime);
Lisa L. Miller & James Eisenstein, The Federal/State Criminal Prosecution Nexus: A Case
Study in Cooperation and Discretion, 30 Law & Soc. Inquiry 239, 242–43 (2005) (explaining
the history of the federalization of crime and noting that “[a] report by the American Bar
Association Task Force on the Federalization of Criminal Law reports that over 40% of all
federal criminal statutes enacted since the Civil War were passed after 1970”).
45. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 16 (2018) (deﬁning “crime of violence,” which includes state
and federal offenses); id. § 249 (deﬁning hate crimes that involve predicate kidnapping and
other enumerated state law offenses); id. § 924(c)(3) (deﬁning drug trafficking crimes
involving crimes of violence deﬁned in part by state law); id. § 1111(a) (deﬁning the felony
murder rule with enumerated crimes that can qualify under state law); id. § 1461
(criminalizing mailing materials that can induce violations of enumerated state crimes); id.
§ 1652 (enumerating murder or robbery against the United States in piracy actions); id.
§ 1956(c)(7) (deﬁning “speciﬁed unlawful activity” involving enumerated state law crimes);
id. § 1959 (enumerating state crimes that constitute violent crimes in aid of racketeering);
id. § 1961 (deﬁning “racketeering activity” as involving enumerated state crimes); id. § 1991
(enumerating state crimes while entering a train); id. § 3142(g) (outlining bail
determinations based on “crime of violence”); id. § 3156(a)(4) (deﬁning “crime of
violence” as including certain state crimes); id. § 3185 (enumerating state crimes
punishable while a fugitive is in ﬂight); id. § 3559(c) (deﬁning a federal life sentence for
predicate violent felonies under state law); 21 U.S.C. § 841(b) (2018) (enhancing sentences
for certain drug crimes based partly on state law); 34 U.S.C. § 20911 (2018) (outlining the
Sex Offender Registration and Notiﬁcation Act (SORNA) that requires registration based
on state law sex offenses).
46. See United States v. Chapman, 866 F.3d 129, 136 (3d Cir. 2017) (Jordan, J.,
concurring) (critiquing the expansion of the categorical approach across different areas of
criminal law).
47. See Sharpless, Deportation Rules, supra note 28, at 944 (citing as an example State
v. Hearns, 961 So. 2d 211, 212 (Fla. 2007), which held that the elements of an offense are
the only relevant factors in determining whether a prior conviction constitutes a forcible
felony).
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predicates for a corresponding federal sanction.48 Courts ﬁlled the
legislative gap by designing the categorical approach.49
This Part analyzes the practical application of the categorical approach by outlining the distinct steps and substeps courts employ when
deciding cases. These multiple steps have in turn produced variations of
the categorical approach, which has produced nonuniformity with
signiﬁcant consequences. These variations and consequences are analyzed
under two statutes in which its nonuniformity is perhaps most impactful:
applying the ACCA’s enhanced ﬁfteen-year mandatory minimum sentence
to thousands more based on state criminal convictions, and deporting
hundreds of thousands of noncitizens through the INA for their state
criminal convictions.50 As the analysis of these two statutes shows, not only
has the categorical approach failed to deliver uniformity in application,
but it has also resulted in disparate sanctioning outcomes because of its
unnecessary reliance on the elements of state criminal law.
A.

The Multi-Step Categorical Approach

The practice of the categorical approach is best understood in three
steps. At Step One, a court must determine the federal elements of an
enumerated crime. Courts have employed a variety of different ways of
crafting such federal elements,51 but in many cases they craft their own
“generic deﬁnition” of the enumerated crime.52 “By ‘generic,’” courts
mean “the offenses must be viewed in the abstract, to see whether the state
statute shares the nature of the federal offense that serves as a point of
comparison.”53 The Court has also formed “generic” deﬁnitions by getting

48. See, e.g., Carissa Byrne Hessick, Johnson v. United States and the Future of the Voidfor-Vagueness Doctrine, 10 N.Y.U. J.L. & Liberty 152, 157–61 (2016) [hereinafter Hessick,
Johnson v. United States] (describing vague immigration and federal sentencing statutes that
could be reshaped by void-for-vagueness doctrine); Jennifer Lee Koh, Crimmigration and
the Void for Vagueness Doctrine, 2016 Wis. L. Rev. 1127, 1133 [hereinafter Koh,
Crimmigration] (arguing that the vagueness of immigration laws that determine federal
sanctions supports an elements-based categorical approach).
49. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
50. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
51. See, e.g., Torres v. Lynch, 136 S. Ct. 1619, 1622 (2016) (explaining that “more than
half” of the INA’s subsections ﬁt into this category, cross-referencing a federal crime that
would qualify as an aggravated felony (citations omitted)); Renteria-Morales v. Mukasey, 551
F.3d 1076, 1081 (9th Cir. 2008) (granting Chevron deference to the Board of Immigration
Appeals’ interpretation of “relating to obstruction of justice” as an aggravated felony
(quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(S) (2006))); see also Shannon M. Grammel, Chevron Meets
the Categorical Approach, 70 Stan. L. Rev. 921, 960 (2018) (highlighting circuit splits on
applying Chevron deference).
52. See, e.g., Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 598 (1990) (creating a generic
deﬁnition of the enumerated crime of burglary).
53. Moncrieffe v. Holder, 569 U.S. 184, 190 (2013).
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a “sense in which the [crime enumerated by Congress] is now used in the
criminal codes of most states.”54
Step Two is where the complexity curve spikes, requiring courts to
determine the elements of the state crime of conviction. When the
Supreme Court created this step, it may have sounded simple,55 but the
devil is often in the details of state law. Step Two often involves an intricate
reading of the state’s criminal statute, as well as detailed analyses of state
court decisions to determine which terms from a statute encompass the
elements of the state crime.56 The Court’s holding in Mathis v. United States,
which explained that there is a distinction between a state statute listing
elements and one listing mere facts, further complicated this analysis of
state law.57 “‘Elements’ are the ‘constituent parts’ of a crime’s legal
deﬁnition—the things the ‘prosecution must prove to sustain a
conviction’” and “what the jury must ﬁnd beyond a reasonable doubt to
convict the defendant.”58 Facts, sometimes referred to as the mere means
to fulﬁll these elements, are “real-world things—extraneous to the crime’s
legal requirements . . . . In particular, they need neither be found by a jury
nor admitted by a defendant.”59 Making this elements/means distinction
has proven to be no simple task. In Mathis, for example, the Court had to
parse through multiple sections and subsections of the Iowa criminal code
and cite the Iowa Supreme Court to determine exactly what were the
necessary elements to convict a defendant of burglary in that state.60
Ultimately, the case was decided based upon the state-speciﬁc technicality
that the Iowa statute listed means, not actual elements.61 These differences
in how a state has structured the text of a particular criminal statute can
come down to minute details, such as whether several possible offenses are

54. Taylor, 495 U.S. at 598 (crafting a federal generic deﬁnition of “burglary”); see also
Quarles v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 1872, 1879 (2019) (clarifying the generic deﬁnition of
“burglary” in light of “the ordinary understanding of burglary as of 1986” when Congress
amended the ACCA in part based on “the States’ law at that time”).
55. See Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243, 2256 (2016) (describing the “threshold
inquiry—elements or means?” as being “easy in this case, as it will be in many others”);
Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254, 272 (2013) (describing the question of divisibility
as having a “simple answer”); Taylor, 495 U.S. at 601 (arguing that an elements-based
categorical approach avoided the “daunting” and inefficient conduct-based approach).
56. See De Lima v. Sessions, 867 F.3d 260, 268 (1st Cir. 2017) (describing “[e]ven a
single such categorical analysis” as “an arduous task,” which “is often difficult and time
consuming”).
57. See 136 S. Ct. at 2248.
58. Id. (citing Richardson v. United States, 526 U.S. 813, 817 (1999); Elements of
Crime, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014)).
59. Id. (citing Richardson, 526 U.S. at 817; Fact, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014)).
60. Id. at 2250, 2256–57 (citing State v. Rooney, 862 N.W.2d 367, 376 (Iowa 2015);
State v. Duncan, 312 N.W.2d 519, 523 (Iowa 1981)).
61. Id. at 2254–57.
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all listed disjunctively62 or in sub-paragraphs,63 or merely contain the
placement of an “or.”64
If this textual consultation of the statute and research into state
precedent does not yield a clear answer to the elements/means question,
the Court prescribes yet another substep referred to as a “modiﬁed peek,”
allowing a court to “peek at the [record] documents,”65 such as “the
indictment, jury instructions, or plea agreement and colloquy”66 (often
referred to as Shepard documents).67 Such a “peek” cannot be used to
consider the factual criminal conduct committed by the offender, but can
only be used to determine the necessary elements as listed in an
indictment or instructions to a jury.68 So, if such a “peek” into an indictment revealed that a defendant was charged with “burgling a ‘building,
structure, or vehicle,’” the Court would believe this was enough to clarify
that “each alternative is only a possible means of commission, not an element
that the prosecutor must prove to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.”69
At Step Three, a court compares the elements of the federal version
of the enumerated crime (from Step One) to the elements of the state law
version of the crime (from Step Two). If the state criminal elements match
or criminalize narrower conduct than the federal criminal elements, the
previous state criminal conviction can serve as a predicate to impose the
corresponding federal sanction.70 If, however, the state criminal elements
do not match, or criminalize broader conduct than the federal criminal
elements, then the state conviction cannot serve as a predicate.71 But yet
again, the Court created another substep to this analysis if a state criminal
statute is divisible, meaning that it lists alternative sets of elements.72 If one
set of these state criminal elements would match with the federal criminal

62. See infra notes 101–103 and accompanying text.
63. See infra notes 101–103 and accompanying text.
64. See infra notes 137–147 and accompanying text.
65. Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2256 (alteration in original) (quoting Rendon v. Holder, 782
F.3d 466, 473–74 (9th Cir. 2015) (Kozinski, J., dissenting)).
66. Id. at 2249.
67. See Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 17–21 (2005) (establishing documents
of conclusive records that courts can consult under the modiﬁed categorical approach).
68. See United States v. Pam, 867 F.3d 1191, 1206 n.14 (10th Cir. 2017) (recognizing
modiﬁed peek as different from the modiﬁed categorical approach); United States v.
Powell, No. 6:03-CR-60122-AA, 2016 WL 8732306, at *9 n.11 (D. Or. Feb. 5, 2016)
(classifying the modiﬁed peek approach as a “minor variant of the modiﬁed categorical
approach”).
69. Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2257 (emphasis added).
70. Id.; Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254, 257 (2013); Taylor v. United States,
495 U.S. 575, 599–600 (1990).
71. See, e.g., Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2256–57 (holding that Iowa burglary was broader
than generic burglary); Descamps, 570 U.S. at 264–65 (holding that California burglary was
broader than generic burglary).
72. Descamps, 570 U.S. at 261–63 (outlining the development of the modiﬁed
categorical approach).
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elements, but another set of elements would not, another “variant” of the
categorical approach—“labeled (not very inventively) the ‘modiﬁed
categorical approach’”73—would apply. While this substep was originally
contemplated in Taylor v. United States,74 it was further developed in
Shepard v. United States—which established the acceptable universe of
possible documents75 courts could consult in a “modiﬁed peek”—and
Descamps v. United States—which clariﬁed the differences between divisible
and indivisible state-law statutes.76 The modiﬁed categorical approach
allows a court to examine generally the same set of Shepard documents as
the “modiﬁed peek” to determine under which set of state criminal
elements—the qualifying or nonqualifying set—the offender was
convicted.77 After the correct set of convicting elements is determined, the
court continues the categorical analysis to match that set of elements to
the federal criminal elements of the enumerated crime.
If the categorical approach sounds complicated in practice, that is
because it is. These varieties of application of the categorical approach
constitute one aspect of nonuniformity. Some state laws trigger the regular
categorical approach, while some others trigger application of the
modiﬁed categorical approach, while yet others trigger a modiﬁed peek
approach. This variety of application has caused jurisprudential havoc for
courts applying the ACCA and the INA.
B.

The ACCA and Criminal Sentencing Enhancements

For nearly thirty years, ACCA jurisprudence has served as the primary
vehicle shaping the categorical approach.78 These cases are often cited to
export the Court’s application of the categorical approach to other areas
of law to which the categorical approach also applies.79 Promoted in the
early 1980s in the midst of a nationalized fear of drugs and crime,80
Congress enacted the ACCA with the intention of imposing heightened
73. Id. at 257.
74. See 495 U.S. at 600–02.
75. 544 U.S. 13, 17 (2005).
76. 570 U.S. at 261–63.
77. Id. at 263–64.
78. See Sarah French Russell, Rethinking Recidivist Enhancements: The Role of Prior
Drug Convictions in Federal Sentencing, 43 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1135, 1177 (2010) (citing
legislative history showing incapacitation as one of Congress’s primary goals in passing
the ACCA).
79. See, e.g., Moncrieffe v. Holder, 569 U.S. 184, 190 (2013) (citing ACCA
jurisprudence in an immigration case).
80. Michael Schearer, The Armed Career Criminal Act: Imprecise, Indeterminate, and
Unconstitutional 3 (Dec. 3, 2015), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2698973 (on ﬁle with the
Columbia Law Review) (unpublished manuscript) (“In the two decades from 1960 to 1980,
violent crime in the United States rose by an astounding 271%. . . . [T]he burglary rate
increased by 231% and robbery increased by 318%. Similar increases were noted in rates of
forcible rape, aggravated assault, property crime, larceny, and motor vehicle theft.”
(footnotes omitted)).
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sentences to incapacitate particularly dangerous repeat offenders.81
Congress designed the ACCA to impose a sentencing enhancement for
defendants who were convicted in federal court for being a felon in
possession of a ﬁrearm and also had previously been convicted of at least
three “violent felon[ies].”82 The term “violent felony” is loosely deﬁned in
the statute, but Congress speciﬁed that state convictions for burglary,
arson, and extortion qualify.83
Establishing uniformity in ACCA jurisprudence was of the utmost
importance to the Court when fashioning the categorical approach, but
the Court’s ACCA jurisprudence has ironically ensured nonuniformity.
The Court recognized “[t]his point [as] critically important. Congress’
basic goal in passing [the new federal sentencing regime] was to move the
sentencing system in the direction of increased uniformity.”84 As
referenced above, from the Court’s ﬁrst foray into applying the categorical
approach in an effort to achieve such uniformity in an ACCA case in
Taylor, to more recent cases of Descamps and Mathis, the Court has created
multiple variants of the categorical approach that are triggered according
to different variations of state law.
Taylor started this jurisprudence by addressing whether a conviction
under Missouri’s second-degree burglary statute qualiﬁed as an ACCA
predicate.85 Part of the Court’s justiﬁcation for using the categorical
approach in federal sentencing law was to preserve what it perceived to be
the intent of Congress that “the same type of conduct” be “punishable on
the Federal level in all cases.”86 The Court rejected a type of state-law
labeling approach, which would only require that a defendant be
convicted of a state law that matches the label of a congressionally
enumerated crime.87 Taking burglary as the example, the Court realized

81. See Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 581 (1990) (“The House Report
accompanying the Act explained that a ‘large percentage’ of crimes of theft and violence
‘are committed by a very small percentage of repeat offenders,’ and that robbery and
burglary are the crimes most frequently committed by these career criminals.” (quoting
H.R. Rep. No. 98-1073, at 1, 3 (1984))).
82. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1), (e)(2)(B) (2018). In addition, previous convictions for
“serious drug offenses” as deﬁned by subsection (e)(2)(A) can also count toward an ACCA
enhanced sentence. See generally Russell, supra note 78 (outlining inconsistencies in
applying the “serious drug offenses” section of the ACCA).
83. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii); see also U.S. Sent’g Guidelines Manual §§ 2L1.2, 4B1.1
(U.S. Sent’g Comm’n 2018) (providing sentencing guidelines that correspond with the ACCA
in immigration and sentencing enhancement contexts).
84. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 253–54 (2005) (citing 28 U.S.C.
§§ 991(b)(1)(B), 994(f) (2018)).
85. Taylor, 495 U.S. at 577–78.
86. Id. at 582 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting S. Rep.
No. 98-190, at 20 (1983)).
87. Id. at 588–89.
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that different states deﬁne the crime of burglary differently.88 Instead, the
Court invoked the overarching goal of uniformity by pursuing “uniform,
categorical deﬁnitions” and comparing federal and state elements of
crimes.89 It promised that such a categorical approach would avoid the
“vagaries of state law” and impose punishment “regardless of technical
deﬁnitions and labels under state law.”90
But somewhere along the journey, the Court lost its way. By making a
distinction between divisible and indivisible state criminal statutes, and
invoking hypothetical statutes to illustrate the distinction,91 the Court
unintentionally created even more confusion, which some Justices openly
acknowledged.92 By creating the elements/means distinction and making it
a material inquiry in applying the categorical approach, the Court created
yet another well of confusion and another substep and variant of the
categorical approach.93 And yet again, concurring and dissenting Justices
openly acknowledged the difficulty caused by this ever-changing
doctrine.94
The Court’s recent unanimous decision in United States v. Stitt95 stands
as another example of how different state laws confuse the application of
the categorical approach. In Stitt, the Court held that the Tennessee and
Arkansas burglary statutes that criminalized the burgling of vehicles
designed for overnight accommodations96 both ﬁt within the federal
generic deﬁnition of burglary. But that very generic deﬁnition only
prohibits burgling “a building or other structure.”97 Whereas the Taylor
Court speciﬁcally stated that an element of “entry of an automobile” would
not ﬁt under federal generic burglary,98 and Shepard further speciﬁed that
88. Id. at 580 (“The word ‘burglary’ has not been given a single accepted meaning by
the state courts; the criminal codes of the States deﬁne burglary in many different ways.”
(citation omitted)).
89. Id. at 590.
90. Id. at 588, 590.
91. See Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254, 262, 272 (2013) (offering a
hypothetical in which a divisible state statute “criminalizes assault with any of eight speciﬁed
weapons,” while “only assault with a gun counts as an ACCA offense” (emphasis omitted));
Taylor, 495 U.S. at 602.
92. See Quarles v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 1872, 1880–81 (2019) (Thomas, J.,
concurring) (stating that the categorical approach is not necessary); Mathis v. United States,
136 S. Ct. 2243, 2258 (2016) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (criticizing the categorical
approach’s lack of clarity); Descamps, 570 U.S. at 279 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (same); see
also Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2259 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (criticizing the inconsistent
jurisprudence of the categorical approach); Descamps, 570 U.S. at 282 (Alito, J., dissenting)
(same).
93. See supra notes 65–69 and accompanying text.
94. See supra note 92.
95. 139 S. Ct. 399 (2018).
96. See Ark. Code Ann. §§ 5-39-101(1), 5-39-201(a)(1) (1997); Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 3914-403(a), 319-14-401(1)(A)–(B) (1997).
97. Stitt, 139 S. Ct. at 405–06 (citing Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 598 (1990)).
98. Taylor, 495 U.S. at 602.
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elements prohibiting “entries into boats and cars” would not ﬁt under
federal generic burglary,99 Stitt clariﬁed that a state criminal burglary
element prohibiting entries into vehicles could indeed ﬁt into federal
generic burglary if the element speciﬁed that the vehicle was some type of
habitation.100 With this decision, the dicta in Taylor and Shepard that
guided lower courts for decades was fully undone, and with it, any
semblance of uniform application.
A textual comparison is a powerful indicator of the nonuniformity in
the categorical approach. In Shepard, the defendant Reginald Shepard had
four state convictions under the following Massachusetts burglary statute:
Whoever, in the night time, breaks and enters a building, ship,
vessel or vehicle, with intent to commit a felony, . . . shall be
punished by imprisonment in the state prison for not more than
twenty years or in a jail or house of correction for not more than
two and one-half years.101
Compare this to Mathis, in which the defendant Richard Mathis had ﬁve
state convictions under the following Iowa burglary statute:
Any person, having the intent to commit a felony, assault or theft
therein, who, having no right, license or privilege to do so, enters
an occupied structure, such occupied structure not being open to
the public, or who remains therein after it is closed to the public
or after the person’s right, license or privilege to be there has
expired, or any person having such intent who breaks an
occupied structure, commits burglary.102
An “occupied structure” is any building, structure, appurtenances
to buildings and structures, land, water or air vehicle, or similar place
adapted for overnight accommodation of persons, or occupied by
persons for the purpose of carrying on business or other activity
therein, or for the storage or safekeeping of anything of value.103
Two different state statutes triggered two different applications of the
categorical approach. First, in Shepard, the statute was divisible and the
modiﬁed categorical approach applied;104 yet in Mathis, the statute was
indivisible, and the regular categorical approach applied because the
deﬁnition of occupied structure detailed different means, not elements.105
In summary, the Court’s development of the categorical approach
over the past thirty years since Taylor has been inconsistent. It created
multiple versions of the categorical approach—including the regular,

99. Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 17–18 (2005).
100. Stitt, 139 S. Ct. at 406.
101. Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 266, § 16 (West 2000) (emphasis added); id. § 18; see
also Taylor, 495 U.S. at 578 & n.1 (noting that the defendant had two state convictions for
burglary, which at the time was deﬁned by seven distinct statutes).
102. Iowa Code § 713.1 (2013) (emphasis added).
103. Id. § 702.12 (emphasis added).
104. Shepard, 544 U.S. at 25–26.
105. Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243, 2253, 2257 (2016).
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modiﬁed, and peek approaches—that are triggered by the different ways
states may choose to write and design their criminal codes.
Such nonuniform applications also often trigger disparate outcomes
based on the technicalities and variations of state law. Consider again a few
of the defendants cited in the key cases above. Taylor was convicted under
Missouri law for “feloniously and burglariously, forcibly break[ing] and
enter[ing] [a] dwelling house and building.”106 Because of the way
Missouri’s burglary statute was drafted, courts applied the modiﬁed
categorical approach and ultimately applied the enhanced sentence under
the ACCA.107 Shepard was convicted under Massachusetts law for breaking
into a “pantry,” the “back room of a store,” and an “apartment.”108
Shepard’s fate was likely similar to Taylor’s because of the way the
Massachusetts burglary law was drafted. Matthew Descamps was convicted
under California law for “wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously enter[ing] a
building, to-wit: CentroMart[,] . . . a grocery store,”109 but because of the
way California’s law was drafted, the regular categorical approach was
applied and he did not receive an enhanced sentence under the ACCA.110
And Mathis was convicted under Iowa law for “entering garages in relation
to two of his burglary convictions;”111 but because of the way Iowa’s law was
drafted, the regular categorical approach was applied and he did not
receive an enhanced sentence under the ACCA.112 Descamps and Mathis
could both be considered “lucky”113 that their state burglary offenses were
committed in states that drafted burglary statutes that did not sufficiently
conform with the federal generic deﬁnition of the crime. And while a
state’s statutory scheme has nothing to do with these offenders’ moral
blameworthiness, dangerousness, just desert, or any other relevant
sentencing factor, they were treated differently by the federal government
based on the very same “vagaries of state law” the categorical approach was
designed to avoid.114
These statutory and factual comparisons lay the categorical
approach’s nonuniformity bare. Different applications of the categorical
approach are triggered by slight differences in state law. The application
106. United States v. Taylor, 932 F.2d 703, 707 (8th Cir. 1991).
107. Id. at 708–09.
108. United States v. Shepard, 348 F.3d 308, 310 (1st Cir. 2003), rev’d, 544 U.S. 13
(2005).
109. United States v. Descamps, 466 F. App’x 563, 565 (9th Cir. 2012), rev’d, 570 U.S.
254 (2013).
110. Descamps, 570 U.S. at 265; United States v. Descamps, 730 F.3d 968, 968 (9th Cir.
2013) (mem.) (reversing the imposition of an ACCA sentence).
111. United States v. Mathis, 786 F.3d 1068, 1075 (8th Cir. 2015), rev’d, 136 S. Ct. 2243
(2016).
112. United States v. Mathis, 832 F.3d 876, 876 (8th Cir. 2016) (mem.) (reversing the
imposition of an ACCA sentence).
113. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
114. Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 588, 590 (1990) (implementing a uniform
federal deﬁnition of crime to avoid the vagaries of state law).
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of the modiﬁed categorical approach is based on state deﬁnitions and
statutory structure, and the elements/means distinction that compares
only elements to the federal generic version is also based on such nuanced
differences.115 For all the effort of the Court to establish uniformity in
imposing the ACCA’s enhanced criminal sentence, state law rules supreme
and triggers different applications and outcomes under the current
elements-based categorical approach.
C.

The INA and Immigration Deportation

Establishing uniformity in immigration law has always been
“paramount” to courts because “rarely is the vision of a unitary nation so
pronounced as in the laws that determine who may cross our national
borders and who may become a citizen.”116 These immigration decisions
“touch on foreign relations” because of their impact on foreign nationals,
justifying the Court’s mandate that the nation speak “with one voice” in
immigration policy decisions. 117 For this reason, courts have undertaken
great effort to protect uniformity in immigration law, even preempting
state encroachment when such encroachment would result in detrimental
variations in states’ treatment and enforcement of immigration rights.118
115. Compare Brown v. Caraway, 719 F.3d 583, 589–91 (7th Cir. 2013) (holding that a
Delaware conviction for arson was not a violent felony because it lacked the necessary mens
rea), and United States v. Webb, 217 F. Supp. 3d 381, 399 (D. Mass. 2016) (holding that a
Massachusetts conviction for arson was not a violent felony because it lacked the necessary
mens rea), with United States v. Misleveck, 735 F.3d 983, 987–88 (7th Cir. 2013) (holding
that a Wisconsin conviction for arson was a violent felony because it included the necessary
mens rea), and United States v. Buie, No. 1:17-CR-00011, 2018 WL 5619335, at *7–9 (M.D.
Tenn. Oct. 30, 2018) (holding that a Tennessee conviction for arson was a violent felony
even though the relevant Tennessee statute was nearly identical to the Massachusetts statute
in Webb, but for the use of the word “or”); see also Barkow, Categorical Mistakes, supra note
36, at 237 (“Critics are correct that the application of the categorical approach has resulted
in inconsistent treatment of past conduct based on the different wording of state laws.”).
116. Rosendo-Ramirez v. Immigr. & Naturalization Serv., 32 F.3d 1085, 1091 (7th Cir.
1994).
117. Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 409 (2012); see also Hines v. Davidowitz,
312 U.S. 52, 66–67 (1941) (“[T]he regulation of aliens is so intimately blended and
intertwined with responsibilities of the national government that where it acts . . . ‘is
supreme . . . .’” (quoting Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 211 (1824))).
118. See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 382–83 (1971) (emphasizing nationwide
uniformity in immigration policy and stating that allowing “state legislatures to adopt
divergent laws . . . would appear to contravene this explicit constitutional requirement of
uniformity”); Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm’n, 334 U.S. 410, 420 (1948) (limiting the
power of states to regulate immigrant rights because power was reserved for Congress, which
had the responsibility of dealing with foreign nations). But see De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S.
351, 356 (1976) (stating that “[s]tates possess broad authority under their police powers to
regulate the employment relationship to protect workers within the State,” and can
therefore regulate the employment of immigrants without legal status); Gerald L. Neuman,
The Lost Century of American Immigration Law (1776–1875), 93 Colum. L. Rev. 1833,
1835, 1841–80 (1993) (cataloguing how states have historically had more control over
immigration policy).
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But as the case study below shows, the variances of state law trigger
different applications and different outcomes of the categorical approach.
The categorical approach has been a mainstay in immigration law for
over one hundred years.119 Since 1875, Congress has enacted laws seeking
to exclude and deport noncitizens based on their prior criminal
convictions.120 And since 1914 when the Second Circuit decided United
States ex rel. Mylius v. Uhl,121 courts have used the categorical approach to
determine which state crimes should trigger the federal sanction of
removal from the country.122 Even from its infancy, the Mylius court
justiﬁed the categorical approach as an elements-based test that examines
“the nature of the offense,” based on promoting “the interest of a uniform
and efficient administration of the law.”123 And ever since, immigration
decisionmakers have invoked the goal of nationwide uniformity to justify
the continued use of the categorical approach.124
The categorical approach is currently employed in several areas in
immigration law, but chief among them is to determine if a noncitizen
should be removed for having previously committed an “aggravated
felony.”125 This ground for removal was ﬁrst added to the INA in 1988 and
originally only enumerated three qualifying crimes—murder, drug
trafficking, and trafficking in ﬁrearms or other destructive devices.126 The
law served to assuage the 1980s moral panic regarding the perceived
epidemic of drug abuse and trafficking and helped further champion the
War on Drugs, which brought sweeping reform across the immigration

119. Moncrieffe v. Holder, 569 U.S. 184, 191 (2013) (“This categorical approach has a
long pedigree in our Nation’s immigration law.”).
120. See Derrick Moore, Note, “Crimes Involving Moral Turpitude”: Why the Void-forVagueness Argument Is Still Available and Meritorious, 41 Cornell Int’l L.J. 813, 820–21
(2008).
121. 210 F. 860, 862–63 (2d Cir. 1914) (using the categorical approach to determine if
English libel conviction constituted a deportable offense).
122. See United States ex rel. Robinson v. Day, 51 F.2d 1022, 1023 (2d Cir. 1931)
(determining whether a conviction in New York for forgery was a deportable offense); see
also United States ex rel. Guarino v. Uhl, 107 F.2d 399, 400 (2d Cir. 1939) (determining
whether a conviction in New York for possession of a “jimmy” was a deportable offense).
123. Mylius, 210 F. at 862 (emphasis added).
124. See Alina Das, The Immigration Penalties of Criminal Convictions: Resurrecting
Categorical Analysis in Immigration Law, 86 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1669, 1749–60 (2011) (citing
dozens of cases in which federal courts, the Attorney General, and the Board of Immigration
Appeals applied an elements-based categorical approach to determine which state law
crimes qualiﬁed as predicates for removal).
125. See, e.g., Moncrieffe v. Holder, 569 U.S. 184, 190–91 (2013) (“When the
Government alleges that a state conviction qualiﬁes as an ‘aggravated felony’ under the INA,
we generally employ a ‘categorical approach’ to determine whether the state offense is
comparable to an offense listed in the INA.”).
126. See Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, §§ 7342, 7344, 102 Stat.
4181, 4469–71.
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and criminal justice systems.127 Because the harsh sanction of removal
separates noncitizen offenders from their families, their jobs, and all
property acquired here in the United States,128 with very little hope of ever
legally returning,129 one Senator made clear during congressional debates
that this section would only “focus[] on a particularly dangerous class of
‘aggravated alien felons.’”130 But as the country’s taste for tough-on-crime
sanctions grew throughout the 1990s, so too did these grounds for
removal.131 Today’s aggravated felony statute is “‘a colossus’ that is
‘breathtaking’ in scope,”132 having grown to enumerate nearly eighty
different crimes—both federal and state—that qualify as aggravated
felonies.133
As Congress expanded the categories of state crimes that qualiﬁed as
aggravated felonies, so too did the courts’ categorization responsibilities
expand. For example, murder, rape, and burglary all qualify as
“aggravated felonies,”134 but these enumerated crimes were left undeﬁned
by Congress. So courts utilize the categorical approach to determine if a
state law’s version of murder, rape, or burglary—as deﬁned by that state’s
criminal elements of each respective crime—qualify under what Congress
intended when it enumerated murder, rape, and burglary in the INA.135

127. During the passage of the Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, 104 Stat.
4978, President George H.W. Bush remarked that the statute would meet the goals of the
“war on drugs and violent crime.” See Statement on Signing the Immigration Act of 1990,
2 Pub. Papers 1717, 1718 (Nov. 29, 1990). See generally Kevin R. Johnson, Racial Proﬁling
in the War on Drugs Meets the Immigration Removal Process: The Case of Moncrieffe v.
Holder, 48 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 967 (2015) [hereinafter Johnson, Racial Proﬁling in the
War on Drugs] (connecting enforcement practices from the war on drugs to current
immigration enforcement practices).
128. See Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 740–41 (1893) (Brewer, J.,
dissenting) (“Every one knows that to be forcibly taken away from home, and family, and
friends, and business, and property, and sent across the ocean to a distant land, is
punishment, and that oftentimes most severe and cruel.”).
129. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(9)(A) (2018) (detailing conditions under which a deported
person can return to the United States after a ban that ranges from ﬁve to twenty years).
130. 134 Cong. Rec. 32,649 (1988) (statement of Sen. D’Amato).
131. See Rachel E. Barkow, Administering Crime, 52 UCLA L. Rev. 715, 748–49 (2005)
[hereinafter Barkow, Administering Crime] (linking political incentives in the 1990s with
tough-on-crime rhetoric and legislation).
132. Koh, The Whole Better than the Sum, supra note 35, at 270 (ﬁrst quoting Stephen
H. Legomsky, The New Path of Immigration Law: Asymmetric Incorporation of Criminal
Justice Norms, 64 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 469, 484 (2007); then quoting Adam B. Cox &
Cristina Rodríguez, The President and Immigration Law, 119 Yale L.J. 458, 516 (2009)).
133. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43); see also Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204, 1222 n.12
(2018) (noting that “[t]he INA lists 80 or so crimes that count as aggravated felonies”).
134. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(A), (G).
135. See, e.g., Mellouli v. Lynch, 135 S. Ct. 1980, 1986–89 (2015) (applying the
categorical approach in determining whether a Kansas conviction for possession of drug
paraphernalia constituted an aggravated felony); Kawashima v. Holder, 565 U.S. 478, 483
(2012) (determining whether the defendants’ actions involved fraud or deceit under the
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The categorical approach’s reliance on state criminal elements,
however, produces inconsistent and nonuniform results in the
immigration context. The Third Circuit, for example, posed a striking
hypothetical that cut to the heart of nonuniformity of the categorical
approach. Whereas “[a] person convicted of a single offense of simple
possession of 30 grams or less of marijuana in North Dakota, where the
offense is punishable as a felony,” would qualify as an aggravated felon, “a
person convicted of the same offense in Montana, where this crime is only
a misdemeanor, would not be subject to deportation.”136
These different applications are more than just hypothetical,
however, and have actually been illustrated in several cases that applied
the categorical approach differently when dealing with similar New Jersey
and Pennsylvania state laws. Starting with Wilson v. Ashcroft,137 the court
considered whether a conviction under New Jersey law for “possession with
intent to distribut[e]” could qualify as a “drug trafficking” aggravated
felony.138 Speciﬁcally, the New Jersey statute provided as follows:
[I]t shall be unlawful for any person knowingly or purposely . . .
[t]o manufacture, distribute or dispense, or to possess or have
under his control with intent to manufacture, distribute or
dispense, a controlled dangerous substance or controlled
substance analog.139
The court held that this New Jersey crime could not qualify as “drug
trafficking” because the state criminal elements did not require
remuneration.140 The court also declined to apply the modiﬁed categorical
approach “to explore the underlying record or plea allocution to
determine” whether the defendant pleaded to relevant facts that would
illuminate the nature of the defendant’s distribution.141
But in Garcia v. Attorney General of the United States,142 the same court,
triggered by differences in state law, reached a different result after
considering whether the similar Pennsylvania law could qualify as a “drug
trafficking” aggravated felony.143 The Pennsylvania statute provided as
follows:
[T]he manufacture, delivery, or possession with intent to
manufacture or deliver, a controlled substance by a person not
registered under this act, or a practitioner not registered or
licensed by the appropriate State board, or knowingly creating,
categorical approach per the deﬁnition of crime rather than “the speciﬁc facts underlying
the crime”).
136. Gerbier v. Holmes, 280 F.3d 297, 312 (3d Cir. 2002) (citations omitted).
137. 350 F.3d 377 (3d Cir. 2003).
138. Id. at 379 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
139. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:35-5a(1) (West 2000).
140. Wilson, 350 F.3d at 379, 381.
141. Id. at 382.
142. 462 F.3d 287 (3d Cir. 2006).
143. Id. at 289, 292–93.
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delivering or possessing with intent to deliver, a counterfeit
controlled substance.144
Although the court acknowledged that it had reached different results
when considering the “similar . . . New Jersey statute[],” it found that “the
Pennsylvania Act is distinguishable.”145 When determining whether
Pennsylvania’s criminal elements required remuneration, the court
applied the modiﬁed categorical approach since “the Pennsylvania statute
describes three distinct offenses: manufacture, delivery, and possession
with the intent to deliver or manufacture.”146 Because the statute was
drafted in the “disjunctive,” and because it was not clear if violations under
any of these separate crimes necessarily includes remuneration, the court
examined the charging instrument, which ultimately uncovered facts that
clearly outlined remuneration.147
Comparing Wilson and Garcia, the same court (Third Circuit) applied
different variations of the categorical approach (regular versus modiﬁed)
to nearly identical criminal statutes (New Jersey and Pennsylvania). Yet
because of slight differences in the wording of these statutes (placement
of an “or” that created a disjunctive phrase), the court came to different
conclusions on examining the record (not examining versus examining
the charging instrument), which resulted in a signiﬁcant sanctioning
disparity.148
These different applications, caused mostly by the differences in state
law, also produce different immigration outcomes for individual
defendants, even when their conduct is similar. While Everald Wilson was
not ordered by the court to be deported in spite of his possession with
intent to distribute an unspeciﬁed amount of the marijuana,149 Belito
Garcia was ordered to be deported for attempting to sell marijuana to an
144. 35 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 780-113(a)(30) (2006) (emphasis added).
145. Garcia, 462 F.3d at 289.
146. Id. at 293 n.9.
147. Id. at 293.
148. See Nijhawan v. Holder, 557 U.S. 29, 39–40 (2009) (applying the categorical
approach that relied on fact-ﬁnding when an enumerated crime calls for factual
determinations to qualify as an aggravated felony). This hybrid approach has led to many
other examples of inconsistencies, such as with convictions for tax offenses. Compare Lee
v. Ashcroft, 368 F.3d 218, 224–25 (3d Cir. 2004) (holding that a conviction for a tax offense
under 26 U.S.C. § 7206 is not an aggravated felony), with Evangelista v. Ashcroft, 359 F.3d
145, 153 (2d Cir. 2004) (holding that a conviction for a tax offense under 26 U.S.C. § 7201
is an aggravated felony). This inconsistency can also be seen with convictions for
counterfeiting and embezzlement. Compare Valansi v. Ashcroft, 278 F.3d 203, 216–17 (3d
Cir. 2002) (holding that an embezzlement of over $10,000 was not an aggravated felony
when a conviction did not involve intent to defraud), and Ming Lam Sui v. Immigr. &
Naturalization Serv., 250 F.3d 105, 119 (2d Cir. 2001) (holding that possession of
counterfeit traveler’s checks over $10,000 was insufficient to constitute an attempt to pass
checks and cause loss), with In re S-I-K-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 324, 326–29 (B.I.A. 2007) (holding
that an unsuccessful attempt and conspiracy to defraud an insurance company of more than
$10,000 was an aggravated felony).
149. Wilson v. Ashcroft, 350 F.3d 377, 379 (3d Cir. 2003).
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undercover officer and possession of additional packets of marijuana.150
And while no two criminal acts are exactly alike,151 are Wilson’s and
Garcia’s respective crimes so materially different as to justify such
disproportionality? Under the current categorical approach, sanctions are
not meted out based on criminal conduct, which holds some modicum of
reliability to determine continued dangerousness and moral accountability to society;152 instead, the most important factor when deciding
whether to impose the harsh sanction of deportation is the morally
irrelevant “luck”153 of where an offender happened to commit their state
criminal offense.
This tale of two jurisdictions, two applications, and two outcomes for
Wilson and Garcia is one of many similar stories illustrating the impacts of
the categorical approach’s nonuniformity in immigration law. Compare,
for example, the disparities between Bedolla-Zarate v. Sessions154 and PelayoGarcia v. Holder,155 where the differences between Wyoming’s sexual abuse
laws and California’s similar statute resulted in a difference in application
and outcome. The defendant convicted under the Wyoming statute could
be deported for engaging in sexual contact with a young teenager
(thirteen to ﬁfteen years old) when he himself was around twenty-one
years old,156 while the defendant convicted under the California statute
was allowed to stay in the country after having sexual intercourse with a
young teenager (ﬁfteen years old or younger) when he himself was twentyone years old or older.157 Such examples of the categorical approach’s
nonuniformity in deportation abound, and serve as impactful reminders
of the injustices rampant in our system when meting out the sanction of
deportation.158
150. Garcia, 462 F.3d at 293.
151. See infra note 215 and accompanying text.
152. See Jason A. Cade, Enforcing Immigration Equity, 84 Fordham L. Rev. 661, 707
(2015) (arguing that criminal history provides the government with information about
membership choices, such as dangerousness); Adam B. Cox & Eric A. Posner, The SecondOrder Structure of Immigration Law, 59 Stan. L. Rev. 809, 846–47 (2007) (same).
153. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
154. 892 F.3d 1137 (10th Cir. 2018).
155. 589 F.3d 1010 (9th Cir. 2009).
156. See Bedolla-Zarate, 892 F.3d at 1138, 1141 (recording the defendant’s age at the
time of entering the country and the statutory conditions of the age of the victim).
157. Pelayo-Garcia, 589 F.3d at 1014 (outlining the statutory elements of the state crime
needed to fulﬁll the requirements for federal sanctions).
158. For more comparatively disparate outcomes imposing immigration sanctions
based on aggravated felonies, compare Flores-Larrazola v. Lynch, 840 F.3d 234, 240 (5th
Cir. 2016) (holding that an Arkansas conviction for possession of over ten pounds of
marijuana was an aggravated felony), with Arce-Vences v. Mukasey, 512 F.3d 167, 171 (5th
Cir. 2007) (holding that a Texas conviction for possession of over ﬁfty pounds of marijuana
was not an aggravated felony). The same disparity is present in vehicle burglary cases.
Compare Santos v. Immigr. & Naturalization Serv., No. 98-60492 (5th Cir. Sept. 1, 1998)
(per curiam) (holding that a Texas conviction for burgling a vehicle was an aggravated
felony), with Lopez-Elias v. Reno, 209 F.3d 788, 791–92 (5th Cir. 2000) (holding that a Texas
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D. Growing Scrutiny of the Categorical Approach
Such is the state of nonuniformity caused by the categorical
approach’s reliance on state law. When the placement of a seemingly
inconsequential “or” yields incredibly consequential differences between
a regular or enhanced sentence, or between staying in or being banished
from the country, it comes time to reconsider the interpretive tools at
work. Both the “aggravated felony” categorizations under the INA and the
“violent felony” determinations under the ACCA show that different state
laws trigger different applications and outcomes of the categorical
approach. And these different applications are more than mere circuit
splits or doctrinal squabbles between federal judges. Instead, these
different applications have all been prescribed by the Supreme Court to
apply differently according to the differences in state law that lower courts
have encountered.159
These variations of the categorical approach have triggered judicial
critiques that start at the very top. Justice Kennedy, a concurring vote in
both Mathis and Descamps, expressed his concern that dichotomies
between divisible and indivisible statutes, or between elements and means,
are “not all that clear,”160 and that the growing “unworkable” distinctions
between different state laws that trigger different applications of the
categorical approach “should require this Court to revisit its precedents in
an appropriate case.”161 And while Justice Kennedy has since retired from
the Court, Justice Thomas has more recently “question[ed] this
[categorical] approach altogether,” referencing the “absurdity of applying
the categorical approach to the enumerated-offenses clause” of the ACCA
because it prohibits sentencing courts from basing such a harsh sentencing
enhancement on criminal conduct.162 Justice Breyer has also criticized the
conviction for burgling a vehicle under the same law was not an aggravated felony), and
Solorzano-Patlan v. Immigr. & Naturalization Serv., 207 F.3d 869, 874–75 (7th Cir. 2000)
(holding that an Illinois conviction for burgling a vehicle was not an aggravated felony).
Another illuminating example is found in comparing cases involving methamphetamine
possession and distribution. Compare United States v. Almanza-Vigil, 912 F.3d 1310, 1323
(10th Cir. 2019) (holding that a Colorado conviction for “selling or distributing”
methamphetamine was not an aggravated felony), with Perez-Hernandez v. Holder, 332 F.
App’x 458, 462–63 (10th Cir. 2009) (holding that a Utah conviction of “intentional
possession of a controlled or counterfeit substance, namely methamphetamine, with the
intent to distribute” was an aggravated felony), and United States v. Gamez-Macias, No. 2:09cr-00034-RCJ-LRL, 2009 WL 3053701, at *3 (D. Nev. Sept. 18, 2009) (holding that a
Nebraska conviction for possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute was an
aggravated felony).
159. See United States v. Stitt, 139 S. Ct. 399, 407 (2018) (recognizing that a categorical
analysis “rests in part upon state law”); see also United States v. Howard, 742 F.3d 1334, 1346
(11th Cir. 2014) (explaining that “[s]entencing courts conducting divisibility analysis in this
circuit are bound to follow any state court decisions that deﬁne or interpret the statute’s
substantive elements because state law is what the state supreme court says it is”).
160. Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254, 279 (2013) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
161. Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243, 2258 (2016) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
162. Quarles v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 1872, 1880–81 (2019) (Thomas, J., concurring).
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various modiﬁcations to the categorical approach because they “will
unnecessarily complicate federal sentencing law.”163
The Court’s categorical approach has created a legal labyrinth. Lower
courts continue to struggle with the categorical approach’s application,
and this confusion has required the Supreme Court to continually clarify
the categorical approach by taking up more than a dozen cases on
certiorari in the past dozen years in the immigration and sentencing
enhancement contexts alone.164 In just the past two terms, the Court has
taken up six such cases.165 Yet the confusion of lower courts continues.166
One court went as far as to say that in the decades since the adoption of
the categorical approach, it has “struggled to understand the contours of
the Supreme Court’s framework,”167 and that “no other area of the law has
demanded more of [the court’s] resources.”168 Another court described
navigating the difficult application of the categorical approach as going
“down several rabbit holes” that amounted to a “Rube Goldberg
jurisprudence of abstractions piled on top of one another in a manner that
renders doubtful anyone’s conﬁdence in predicting what will pop out at
the end.”169 Another described its “sentencing adventures [as] more
complicated than reconstructing the Staff of Ra in the Map Room to locate
the Well of the Souls.”170 Many have noted how these inconsistencies and
163. Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2259 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
164. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
165. See supra notes 32–33 and accompanying text.
166. See, e.g., U.S. Sent’g Comm’n, Categorical Approach: 2016 Annual National
Seminar (2016), https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/ﬁles/pdf/training/annual-nationaltraining-seminar/2016/backgrounder_categorical-approach.pdf [https://perma.cc/GE9YAP36] (stating that “after the Supreme Court’s decision in Mathis v. United States, . . . courts
continue to grapple with the categorical approach, including the means vs. elements test”).
167. United States v. Aguila-Montes de Oca, 655 F.3d 915, 917 (9th Cir. 2011),
abrogated by Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254, 259–60 (2013).
168. Id.; see also Sykes v. United States, 564 U.S. 1, 33 (2011) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(speculating that the Court would be analyzing state law under the ACCA “until the cows
come home”); De Lima v. Sessions, 867 F.3d 260, 268 (1st Cir. 2017) (noting that “[e]ven a
single such categorical analysis is an arduous task” that “is often difficult and time
consuming”); United States v. Vann, 660 F.3d 771, 787 (4th Cir. 2011) (Agee, J., concurring)
(complaining that “[t]he dockets of . . . all federal courts are now clogged with [ACCA]
cases”).
169. United States v. Tavares, 843 F.3d 1, 19 (1st Cir. 2016).
170. United States v. Perez-Silvan, 861 F.3d 935, 944 (9th Cir. 2017) (Owens, J.,
concurring); see also Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137, 150 (2008) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (describing ACCA doctrine as “piecemeal, suspenseful, [and] Scrabble-like”);
Lopez-Valencia v. Lynch, 798 F.3d 863, 866 (9th Cir. 2015) (“[T]he task of ﬁguring out
whether a prior offense qualiﬁes . . . under the [ACCA] or . . . immigration law would seem
to be a straightforward undertaking. . . . [H]owever, the classiﬁcation has been much more
nuanced, and courts have spent inordinate amounts of time parsing whether a crime falls
into one of these categories.”); United States v. Mayer, 162 F. Supp. 3d 1080, 1095 (D. Or.
2016) (labeling the categorical approach “a Byzantine analytical framework”); Murray v.
United States, Nos. 15-CV-5720 RJB, 96-CR-5367 RJB, 2015 WL 7313882, at *5 (W.D. Wash.
Nov. 19, 2015) (describing the categorical approach as “a hopeless tangle”); Kari Hong, The
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complexities have taxed judicial economy.171 Even the congressional
architects of these statutes have lamented that these laws have resulted in
“costly and time-consuming litigation at every level of the Federal court
system.”172 All of these concerns have contributed to the growing number
of judges who have become more comfortable critiquing the categorical
approach while also acknowledging that they are bound by their respect
for precedent and the rule of law to follow it.173
Scholars are joining this chorus, commenting on the problematic
inconsistencies caused by the categorical approach.174 Even some of the
staunchest defenders of the categorical approach have admitted that it
“arguably creates some disuniformity” that is “inevitable” when
“provisions attempt to map a single federal statute onto various state
criminal laws.”175 “[E]ven lawyers who regularly practice [ACCA cases] can
struggle to understand the doctrine and its occasionally perplexing

Absurdity of Crime-Based Deportation, 50 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 2067, 2124 (2017)
(acknowledging how much courts struggled to apply the categorical approach pre-Descamps
and Mathis).
171. See Das, supra note 124, at 1673, 1735 (“Under a categorical analysis, two people
who commit the same offense but are able to secure different plea deals or are prosecuted
in jurisdictions that deﬁne the offense differently will face different immigration
consequences.”); Evans, Punishing Criminals, supra note 36, at 626; Bennett, supra note 36,
at 1711–12; Eichten, supra note 13, at 1096 (outlining the complexities of aggravated felony
determinations caused by differences in state law).
172. 156 Cong. Rec. 22,587 (2010) (statement of Sen. Specter); see also Avi M. Kupfer,
Note, A Comprehensive Administrative Solution to the Armed Career Criminal Act Debacle,
113 Mich. L. Rev. 151, 152 (2014) (noting inefficiencies of the ACCA due to increased
incentives for criminal defendants to challenge the outcome by exercising their rights to go
to trial).
173. See, e.g., Moreno v. Att’y Gen., 887 F.3d 160, 163 n.3 (3d Cir. 2018) (“The
categorical approach’s disregard of the actual facts of a conviction fosters inconsonant
results, and we would be remiss if we did not note our dismay at having to employ the
categorical approach in this case.”); United States v. Doctor, 842 F.3d 306, 315 (4th Cir.
2016) (Wilkinson, J., concurring) (“I recognize of course that four is not ﬁve, and we have
an obligation to follow a strict elements-based inquiry so long as a majority of the Supreme
Court adheres to it.”).
174. See Barkow, Categorical Mistakes, supra note 36, at 237–38; Das, supra note 124,
at 1673, 1735; Evans, Punishing Criminals, supra note 36, at 624–27; Bennett, supra note 36,
at 1711–12; Eichten, supra note 13, at 1096 (outlining complexities of aggravated felony
determinations caused by differences in state law); see also Lee, The Future of the
Categorical Approach, supra note 22, at 265–66 (highlighting pragmatic critiques adopted
by Supreme Court justices, lower courts, and scholars).
175. Koh, The Whole Better than the Sum, supra note 35, at 297; accord Marouf, supra
note 35, at 1470 (recognizing that the categorical approach “produces some inconsistency
in the sense that two people who engaged in basically the same criminal conduct can be
treated differently under the categorical approach because of variations in how state statutes
are drafted”); Rebecca Sharpless, Finally, a True Elements Test: Mathis v. United States and
the Categorical Approach, 82 Brook. L. Rev. 1275, 1278 (2017) [hereinafter, Sharpless,
Finally, a True Elements Test] (conceding the variation between state crimes gives
prosecutors options in charging crimes, which can result in disparities in immigration
deportation).
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results,”176 which has led to additional transaction costs for parties involved
in these cases.177
What was intended to be a simple, efficient, and uniform rule178 has
instead become a Cerberus; it is a beast with multiple heads, all gnashing
their teeth to prevent judges, scholars, and practitioners from escaping the
Hades of its doctrinal morass. The differences in how a state has outlined
elements of a crime versus factual means to fulﬁll such elements can
trigger different applications and outcomes under the categorical
approach. No longer can the categorical approach be justiﬁed through the
ideal or practical goal of achieving uniformity. Instead, it has become a
threat to uniformity.179 The very “vagaries of state law”180 that the
categorical approach was meant to mitigate have now become its most
controlling factor. So, while many have identiﬁed legitimate
inconsistencies of the categorical approach, we must deal with the root
problem of nonuniformity.

176. Jennifer Lee Koh, Rethinking Removability, 65 Fla. L. Rev. 1803, 1834 (2013)
(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Doug Keller, Causing Mischief for Taylor’s
Categorical Approach: Applying “Legal Imagination” to Duenas-Alvarez, 18 Geo. Mason L.
Rev. 625, 625 (2011)); see also Elissa Bookbinder, Note, The Importance of Being
Earnest . . . (ly) Supporting the Categorical Analysis, 55 Willamette L. Rev. 47, 47 (2018)
(describing the categorical approach as requiring an “Olympic-level gymnastic legal
analysis”).
177. See, e.g., Letter from Lanny A. Breuer, Assistant Att’y Gen., DOJ & Jonathan J.
Wroblewski, Dir., Off. of Pol’y & Legis., DOJ, to Patti B. Saris, J., Chair, U.S. Sent’g Comm’n
(July 23, 2012), https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/ﬁles/pdf/amendment-process/publiccomment/20120815/DOJ_Annual%20Letter_priorities_comment.pdf
[https://perma.cc/NNM6-X7AE] (disclosing the resources U.S. Attorneys Offices expend
litigating the categorical approach under the ACCA); see also Gonzales-Gomez v. Achim,
441 F.3d 532, 534 (7th Cir. 2006) (acknowledging the government’s argument of how
confusing it is for practitioners to determine if drug crimes qualify as aggravated felonies).
178. See supra notes 55, 160 and accompanying text.
179. Rodríguez, Uniformity and Integrity in Immigration Law, supra note 15, at 503–04
(citing Cristina M. Rodríguez, Negotiating Conﬂict Through Federalism: Institutional and
Popular Perspectives, 123 Yale L.J. 2094 (2014)) (stating that “Congress actually has erected
a regime whose design thwarts uniformity, the courts’ best efforts notwithstanding,” in part
because immigration law “incorporate[s] state and local decision-makers into the system”
and “makes the system of removal and relief dependent on the reach of state law”); Mary
Frances Richardson, Comment, Why the Categorical Approach Should Not Be Used When
Determining Whether an Offense Is a Crime of Violence Under the Residual Clause of 18
U.S.C. § 924(c), 67 Am. U. L. Rev. 1989, 2030 (2018) (describing the categorical approach
as a “threat to uniformity,” and explaining that since Taylor, “inconsistency is . . . what it
produced”).
180. Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 588 (1990).
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II. THE CATEGORICAL APPROACH AND TWO UNIFORMITIES
“The question is,” said Alice, “whether you can make words mean
so many different things.”
“The question is,” said Humpty Dumpty, “which is to be master—
that’s all.” 181
The irony of uniformity is that it does not have a uniform deﬁnition.
Uniformity can take on different meanings depending on the context and
the underlying policy goals decisionmakers seek to achieve. Courts, for
their part, use the term “uniformity” in different ways that generally
invoke two different policy outcomes. First, many have justiﬁed uniformity
in terms of application, meaning that the same uniform tools of
interpretation are used in every case; according to this logic, uniformity
can be achieved as long as the categorical approach is applied the same
way to every case.182 Others have referenced uniformity in terms of
outcomes, meaning that similar cases should be adjudicated to impose
similar sanctions.183
Naturally, these two uniformities share signiﬁcant overlap, and need
not be mutually exclusive. Applying the same set of rules to all cases can
lead to similar outcomes under the right circumstances. But as some
scholars have recognized, applying a uniform rule across all jurisdictions
is a different policy goal than an alternative that strives for uniform
sanctioning outcomes.184 In fact, the categorical approach’s deep reliance
on the varieties of state law inherently leads to disparate outcomes.185 As
Part I illustrates, the categorical approach’s nonuniformity reaches levels
near absurdity. Different state laws can and do trigger different
applications of the categorical approach.186 And different state laws can
and do trigger different outcomes among offenders who committed
similar criminal conduct under the categorical approach.187 Basing these
federal sanctions on the disparity-producing factor of state law is
questionable, especially when courts have speciﬁcally promised that these
sanctions would not respect the differences of state law.
This Part explores the differences of these uniformities and their
tensions with theories of punishment and politics. Sections II.A and II.B
181. Lewis Carroll, Through the Looking-Glass, and What Alice Found There 99
(Florence Milner ed., Rand McNally & Co. 1917) (1871).
182. See infra notes 196–198 and accompanying text.
183. See infra note 208 and accompanying text.
184. See Rodríguez, Uniformity and Integrity in Immigration Law, supra note 15, at 506
(arguing that the consistent application of rules in the ﬁeld of “immigration federalism”
means that courts must “accept[] divergent outcomes as non-threatening, particularly when
they are the product of the system Congress has designed”).
185. See id.; see also supra note 175 and accompanying text.
186. See supra notes 101–105, 137–147 and accompanying text.
187. See supra notes 106–114, 149–158 and accompanying text.

1800

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 120:1771

continue the discussion of uniformity by delineating between uniformity
of application and uniformity of outcome respectively. Each uniformity is
examined according to the nuanced differences they exhibit when
establishing legitimacy in sanctioning regimes and inform how we should
think about the inconsistent jurisprudence of the categorical approach.
Section II.C advances the analysis by examining these uniformities and
their compatibility within the context of state variation in a federal system
of government. This section examines whether uniformity is in itself
conducive to federalism, or if it is a fool’s errand to harmonize the
application of federal law across so many separate sovereigns.
A.

Uniformity in Application: Applying the Same Rule to All Cases

Uniform application of federal law across all of the states has a
number of beneﬁts, including promoting the legitimacy of the federal
courts and federal law, which might be undermined if the courts
interpreted and applied the law inconsistently.188 Professor Cristina
Rodríguez has highlighted this type of uniformity that promotes a uniform
approach that applies the same rules to all applicable cases; but because of
the complexities of federal- and state-law interactions in the contexts of
the categorical approach, such a practice of uniform application must
confront and be comfortable with different outcomes, even among similar
cases.189 Promoting legitimacy through consistent application of a rule
shares a natural overlap with its cousin of uniformity in outcomes, but on
a more systemic level. A sanctioning regime that applies the same rules in
all applicable cases, regardless of the participators involved in each case,
does not treat people differently, thus preventing corruption.
The means of the decisionmaking process is what promotes the
legitimacy in a system of uniform application. Taking a variety of legal
inputs (different defendants, different crimes, different circumstances),
putting them through the same meat-grinding process, and producing
what may be similar or different outcomes, is the value of the system.
Everybody gets put through the same process. Applying the same means,
regardless of the inputs or outputs, is what legitimizes the process by
establishing a level of equity that carries a sense of fairness.190
188. See Frost, supra note 39, at 1570 (“The few scholars who have studied the question
assert a number of reasons to promote uniform interpretation of federal law: the legitimacy
of the federal court system and the integrity of federal law are undermined by inconsistent
interpretations of the same statute . . . .”).
189. See Rodríguez, Uniformity and Integrity in Immigration Law, supra note 15, at 506;
see also Gordon et al., supra note 27, § 71.05[2][b] (highlighting the importance of
employing a “uniform rule” to determine which state convictions qualify as aggravated
felonies).
190. See Frost, supra note 39, at 1600–01 (discussing predictability as a beneﬁt that
other scholars have argued justiﬁes uniformity); see also Evan H. Caminker, Why Must
Inferior Courts Obey Superior Court Precedents?, 46 Stan. L. Rev. 817, 850 (1994) (citing
predictability as one of the beneﬁts produced by uniformity).
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Uniform application also beneﬁts people by giving them reliable
notice.191 When participants in societies know what rules will be applied ex
ante to given circumstances, those participants can appropriately order
their participation.192 When there are measures of unpredictability
inserted into this decisionmaking process, the rule of law naturally loses
some of its binding power over society, which in turn affects how
participants think about their participation.193 This might work out in
theory with participants thinking they can get away with more acts of
lawlessness, or participants who enjoy hierarchical beneﬁts in society
believing different rules will apply to their acts of lawlessness, thus adding
levels to the once-level playing ﬁeld. Under this scenario, those on
different levels might perceive the fairness of the system differently, having
to follow different rules, which can reinforce and perpetuate such
hierarchies and diminish the legitimacy of the system.
The predictability of uniform application also carries with it beneﬁts
of economy.194 The categorical approach strives to be a one-size-ﬁts-asmany-as-possible approach; because it applies to several different areas of
law, such as immigration and criminal sentencing, “one approach” and
“one body of law” can be cited interchangeably in these different subject
matters.195 Judges continue to lean on this justiﬁcation, touting the
uniform application of the categorical approach as one that provides
stability in complicated areas of the law.196 As one judge described, it is
“[c]omplex, to be sure, but at least uniform in application.”197 And with
191. See Rodríguez, Uniformity and Integrity in Immigration Law, supra note 15, at 501
(noting that “[u]niformity can advance the elemental principle of fairness by providing
parties bound by the law with notice of its content and how it will be applied”).
192. See Michael M. O’Hear, The Original Intent of Uniformity in Federal Sentencing,
74 U. Cin. L. Rev. 749, 791–804 (2006) (outlining the beneﬁts of predictability paradigms
in determinative sentencing).
193. See Frost, supra note 39, at 1570 (noting how some scholars argue that without
uniformity in the law, “the legitimacy of the federal court system and the integrity of federal
law are undermined” and “predictability would suffer”).
194. See Rodríguez, Uniformity and Integrity in Immigration Law, supra note 15, at 501
(stating that uniformity can hold executive and judicial actors accountable and prevent
arbitrary decisions, thus promoting “pragmatic values such as efficient administration by
bringing clarity to the law and its implementation”).
195. See United States v. Torres, 923 F.3d 420, 424–25 (5th Cir. 2019) (noting the
applicability of the categorical approach in ACCA cases, sentencing guideline cases,
immigration cases, and cases interpreting 18 U.S.C. § 16(a)–(b) (2018)).
196. See, e.g., Amos v. Lynch, 790 F.3d 512, 518 (4th Cir. 2015) (noting that the
categorical approach “allows federal laws to be applied uniformly”); see also Kahn v.
Immigr. & Naturalization Serv., 36 F.3d 1412, 1414 (9th Cir. 1994) (“The INA ‘was designed
to implement a uniform federal policy,’ and the meaning of concepts important to its
application are ‘not to be determined according to the law of the forum, but rather
require[] a uniform federal deﬁnition.’” (quoting Rosario v. Immigr. & Naturalization Serv.,
962 F.2d 220, 223 (2d Cir. 1992))); Gordon et al., supra note 27, § 71.05[2][b] (“[W]hether
a state conviction can be considered an aggravated felony for immigration purposes is best
determined according to a uniform rule based on set federal standards.”).
197. United States v. Mayer, 560 F.3d 948, 952 (9th Cir. 2009) (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
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greater predictability come fewer transaction costs since there will be fewer
legal challenges and fewer practitioners and judges trying to make sense
of inconsistencies in the process.198
This brief consideration of the goals of uniform application inform
the failure of the categorical approach in the context of uniformly
applying state-to-federal sanctions. The categorical approach has not
delivered on promoting legitimacy; instead, it has promoted wide-ranging
criticisms resulting from its lack of predictability and its burdensome
taxation on economy.199 As Part I shows, the categorical approach has
several applications triggered under various circumstances. The Taylor and
Mathis cases illustrate how defendants who commit similar criminal
conduct—burgling supply sheds and garages200—received drastically
different punishments based on the “uniform” application of the
categorical approach.201 Taylor himself received a sentence 125% longer
than Mathis for committing similar crimes in different jurisdictions.202
Comparing the Wilson and Garcia cases is another example of how
uniformity in application can produce jarring disparities in punishment;
whereas both defendants committed similar crimes—being caught with
large enough amounts of marijuana to raise suspicion of drug
distribution203—Wilson was not deported while Garcia was deported. But
proponents of the categorical approach would support these outcomes
since the same tripartite categorical approach was applied consistently to
both cases.204
This is where the uniform application of the categorical approach
comes into conﬂict with its original design metrics. Without undercutting
the beneﬁts of uniformity of application in other contexts, the categorical
approach was speciﬁcally designed to provide uniform application of a

198. See Frost, supra note 39, at 1570 (“[S]cholars . . . assert a number of reasons to
promote uniform interpretation of federal law . . . [including that] predictability would
suffer, raising the costs of doing business and fostering litigation . . . .”).
199. See supra notes 166–173 and accompanying text.
200. See United States v. Mathis, 786 F.3d 1068, 1075 (8th Cir. 2015); United States v.
Taylor, 932 F.2d 703, 706–07 (8th Cir. 1991).
201. Compare Taylor, 932 F.2d at 704, 709–10 (affirming a ﬁfteen-year (180 month)
sentence), with United States v. Mathis, 911 F.3d 903, 905, 910 (8th Cir. 2018) (affirming
an eighty-month sentence).
202. See Sheldon A. Evans, In the Shadow of Shular: Conduct Can Unify the Disjointed
Categorical Approaches, 32 Fed. Sent’g Rep. 231, 233 (2020) (describing the sentencing
disparity between the Taylor and Mathis cases).
203. See Garcia v. Att’y Gen., 462 F.3d 287, 293 (3d Cir. 2006); Wilson v. Ashcroft, 350
F.3d 377, 379 (3d Cir. 2003).
204. See Rodríguez, Uniformity and Integrity in Immigration Law, supra note 15, at 506
(describing the jurisprudence of Justice Sotomayor as valuing uniformity of application even
at the sake of disparate outcomes); see also Koh, The Whole Better than the Sum, supra
note 35, at 297 (justifying the disparate outcomes of the categorical approach through its
many beneﬁts); Sharpless, Toward a True Categorical Elements Test, supra note 35, at 1031–
34 (same).

2020]

CATEGORICAL NONUNIFORMITY

1803

rule irrespective of the “vagaries of state law.”205 Therefore, because the
categorical approach produces such disparities because of the very
“vagaries” it set out to ignore, it has failed to provide the type of uniform
application the Court envisioned in its original blueprint.206 And in the
context of criminal justice, immigration, and the deprivation of liberty, the
inconsistencies and inefficiencies of application are all the more
detrimental to society because of the rights of individuals at stake.207
B.

Uniformity in Outcome: Applying Similar Sanctions in Similar Cases

Pursuing uniformity of sanctioning outcomes for similar cases shares
many of the same goals as its cousin that promotes a uniform application
of legal rules, such as legitimacy, predictability, and economy. But a system
ensuring uniform outcomes does so on a more individual level. It is a
promise between a sovereign and its individual citizens that everyone is on
a fair and equal playing ﬁeld when it comes to sanctioning outcomes. And
courts have long justiﬁed the categorical approach with the argument that
it preserves this goal of uniformity by ensuring that similar cases will result
in similar sanctioning outcomes regardless of the differences of state
law.208
Deﬁning what it means to achieve uniform sanctioning outcomes
among similar cases is not easy,209 but relevant federal sentencing practices
205. Taylor, 495 U.S. at 588, 590.
206. See id.
207. See Charles Hobson, Atkins v. Virginia, Federalism, and Judicial Review, 11
Widener L. Rev. 23, 23–24 (2004) (arguing that courts should treat punishment—which is
a necessary part of the criminal justice system—with extra care due to the life, liberty, and
property interests at stake for both the victims and defendants); see also Kevin R. Reitz, The
Federal Role in Sentencing Law and Policy, 543 Annals Am. Acad. Pol. & Soc. Sci. 116, 127
(1996) (“[I]f any governmental function should be diffused and made subject to multiple
political and structural constraints, it is the sentencing power. The inﬂiction of criminal
penalties is the most extreme form of coercion used by government against its own
citizens.”).
208. See, e.g., Gerbier v. Holmes, 280 F.3d 297, 299 (3d Cir. 2002) (“We believe that
this conclusion properly reﬂects the policy favoring uniformity in construction of the INA
because it subjects aliens to the same treatment regardless of how different states might
categorize similar drug crimes.”); Immigr. Laws—Offenses Involving Moral Turpitude, 37
Op. Att’y Gen. 293, 295 (1933) (advocating for an elements-based categorical approach to
promote “uniformity of treatment” of noncitizens who “are shown to have been convicted
of the same kind of crime,” and also to ensure “the efficient administration of the
immigration laws” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States ex rel. Mylius
v. Uhl, 203 F. 152, 153 (S.D.N.Y. 1913))).
209. See Philip Selznick, The Moral Commonwealth: Social Theory and the Promise of
Community 490 (1992) (discussing the difficulty of deﬁning the legal mantra of treating
like cases alike); Josh Bowers, Legal Guilt, Normative Innocence, and the Equitable
Decision Not to Prosecute, 110 Colum. L. Rev. 1655, 1673 (2010) (citing Peter Westen,
The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 537, 593 (1982)) (“But what of the principle
that like cases should be treated alike? . . . This is no facile question, because the principle
lacks ﬁxed content and is, instead, frequently invoked but seldom deﬁned.”); see also
Kenneth I. Winston, On Treating Like Cases Alike, 62 Calif. L. Rev. 1, 17–20 (1974)
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are informative. Achieving this goal of uniformity has been an ongoing
tug-of-war between determinate and indeterminate sentencing debates
going back to the 1970s, which undergirded the sweeping federal
sentencing reform of the 1980s that remains in place today.210 During
these debates, treating like cases alike more speciﬁcally meant that
similarly situated defendants should receive similar sentences,
while differently situated defendants should receive different sentences.211
And in today’s punishment regime that favors retributivism,212 conductbased punishment remains the dominant regime. That is, our system
strives to increase the importance of criminal conduct when determining
an appropriate sanction. Some legal philosophers prefer such a conductbased punishment regime because they argue that focusing on an
offender’s blameworthy conduct “better accounts for common moral
intuitions.”213 Under this same logic, H.L.A. Hart posited that “the ideal
of justice” demands “treating morally like cases alike and morally different
ones differently.”214
This requires examination of what indeed makes two cases sufficiently
morally similar or distinct. As Professor Josh Bowers has studied, treating
like cases alike can achieve nonsensical results by either oversimplifying
material similarities or overscrutinizing immaterial differences.215 In other
words, all cases are alike if viewed from a certain level of abstraction, but
(challenging the equality principle given that “[c]ases always overﬂow the boundaries within
which rules attempt to conﬁne them”).
210. See O’Hear, supra note 192, at 753–56 (tracing eight different questions about
uniformity that reformers in criminal sentencing have had to confront, illustrating the
different goals of various theories of uniformity).
211. Act of Oct. 12, 1984, ch. 58, 98 Stat. 2017, 2018 (codiﬁed as amended at 28 U.S.C.
§ 991(b)(1)(B) (2018)) (specifying the goal of providing certainty and fairness in
sentencing and avoiding sentencing disparities); S. Rep. No. 98-225, at 52 (1983), as
reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3183, 3235 (“A primary goal of sentencing reform is the
elimination of unwarranted sentencing disparity.”); id. at 45–46 (1983), as reprinted in 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3228–29 (ﬁnding that “[s]entencing disparities that are not justiﬁed by
differences among offenses or offenders are unfair both to offenders and to the public”);
see also Rodríguez, Uniformity and Integrity in Immigration Law, supra note 15, at 501
(“Uniformity also facilitates equal treatment by subjecting the same conduct to the same
rules or sanctions, regardless of where or when the conduct occurs.”).
212. See Michele Cotton, Back with a Vengeance: The Resilience of Retribution as an
Articulated Purpose of Criminal Punishment, 37 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 1313, 1354–55 (2000)
(noting that the Supreme Court has previously made a “most emphatic endorsement of
retribution” in Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447 (1984)); Adam J. Kolber, The Time-Frame
Challenge to Retributivism 2–3 (N.Y. Univ. Sch. of L., Public Law Research Paper No. 18-48,
2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3281979 (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review)
(describing time-frame retributivism as the dominant consideration of sentencing judges).
213. See Bowers, supra note 209, at 1676 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
Dan M. Kahan & Martha C. Nussbaum, Two Conceptions of Emotion in Criminal Law, 96
Colum. L. Rev. 269, 358 (1996)).
214. H.L.A. Hart, Punishment and Responsibility: Essays in the Philosophy of Law 80
(2d ed. 2008).
215. Bowers, supra note 209, at 1674.
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no two cases are really exactly alike if viewed from a certain level of
speciﬁcity. But the morality that undergirds notions of equity and fairness
in a retributivist system are most often linked back to criminal conduct.216
Punishing people equally for committing similar enough actus reus with
the requisite mens rea rings just. But even under current federal
sentencing practices, there is a measure of individualizing punishment
based on a number of factors that measure a defendant’s dangerousness
and potential recidivism, and deter the defendant from future
criminality.217 When exploring the infamous axes of the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines, the same conduct can be punished differently
based on individualized factors that justify such a disparity.218 And with the
increase of judicial discretion and departures, these disparities can widen
even further.219 Yet a conduct-based sanctioning regime still remains one
of the bedrock principles of the hybrid federal criminal justice system, and
must inform how we deﬁne the goal of uniformity.
When discussing these individualized disparities of sanctioning
outcomes, many will argue along the lines of moral justness.220 If
Defendant A and Defendant B teamed up and robbed a liquor store
together, should they be punished differently if Defendant A has a longer
criminal history than Defendant B? There are many on both sides of this
debate, but there are interweaving issues of philosophy, morality, and
deterrence at play when discussing such a scenario. Should the fact that
216. See Marc O. DeGirolami, Against Theories of Punishment: The Thought of Sir
James Fitzjames Stephen, 9 Ohio St. J. Crim. L. 699, 704 (2012) (citing Michael Moore,
Placing Blame: A General Theory of Criminal Law 91 (1997)) (describing retributivism
approaches that “rely on a universal moral intuition that crime and punishment ﬁt together
hand-in-glove”).
217. See Alice Ristroph, Respect and Resistance in Punishment Theory, 97 Calif. L. Rev.
601, 621 (2009) (describing hybrid theories of retributive and consequentialist punishment
that “holds that moral desert speciﬁes a range of permissible penalties, and utilitarian
considerations should drive the selection of appropriate penalties within that range”).
218. U.S. Sent’g Guidelines Manual ch. 5, pts. A, H (U.S. Sent’g Comm’n 2018); see
also 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2018) (outlining sentencing factors that include individual
characteristics and the circumstances of defendants); Wayne A. Logan, Creating a “Hydra
in Government”: Federal Recourse to State Law in Crime Fighting, 86 B.U. L. Rev. 65, 90
(2006) [hereinafter Logan, Creating a “Hydra in Government”] (recognizing the goal of
Congress in determinative sentencing to eliminate unwarranted disparities, while accepting
warranted disparities); O’Hear, supra note 192, at 750 (recognizing that “uniformity seeks
to eliminate unwarranted sentencing disparities, but also to provide for warranted disparities.
The problem lies in distinguishing the warranted from the unwarranted”).
219. U.S. Sent’g Comm’n, Demographic Differences in Federal Sentencing Practices:
An Update of the Booker Report’s Multivariate Regression Analysis 23–24 (2010) (providing
evidence that sentencing disparities increased along racial lines, particularly with increasing
sentences for Black men and noncitizens); Crystal S. Yang, Have Interjudge Sentencing
Disparities Increased in an Advisory Guidelines Regime? Evidence from Booker, 89 N.Y.U. L.
Rev. 1268, 1315 (2014) (ﬁnding that interjudge sentencing disparities doubled since the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines became advisory after United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220
(2005)).
220. See supra notes 213–214 and accompanying text.
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Defendant B has a more consistent work history, or attained a higher level
of education, or enjoys more family support at home color a sentencing
disparity?221 Especially when such disparities are proxies for color.222 And
then there are the disparities that neither Defendant A nor Defendant B
have any control over, such as disparities caused by different judges,
different lead and line prosecutors, different public defenders, and a host
of other variables, each of which can materially affect sentencing
outcomes.223 And while such disparities are patently unfair, they have been
accepted within the ambit of being sufficiently just. All criminal and civil
sanctioning regimes will have various levels of disparate outcomes.
Imperfect administration of the law is an unavoidable byproduct when the
administrators themselves are imperfect.
This Article does not seek to draw broad lines between which
disparities are warranted versus unwarranted, but utilizes this discussion to
determine whether downstream federal sanctioning disparities are
warranted when they are based on the differences between state laws. The
categorical approach, like all laws, will always have a measure of outcome
disparities based on warranted sentencing factors, but different state laws
do not share any of the justiﬁcation of these factors. As one judge noted,
this is actually “an impediment to uniformity” since “two defendants
who . . . committed identical criminal acts in two different states and have
essentially the same criminal history” may receive different sanctioning
outcomes, which “depends not on their past criminal conduct but on the

221. See Stephen J. Schulhofer, Assessing the Federal Sentencing Process: The Problem
Is Uniformity, Not Disparity, 29 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 833, 835–36 (1992) (using a similar
example to explain “unwarranted disparity” in sentencing).
222. See Bernard E. Harcourt, Risk as a Proxy for Race: The Dangers of Risk Assessment,
27 Fed. Sent’g Rep. 237, 238–40 (2015) (providing empirical evidence that actuary risk
assessment tools in sentencing exacerbate racial disparities, and that criminal history serves
as a proxy for race due to discriminatory enforcement priorities against minority
communities); Carissa Byrne Hessick, Race and Gender as Explicit Sentencing Factors, 14
J. Gender Race & Just. 127, 138 (2010) (outlining how the history of explicitly using race
and gender as sentencing factors pervades modern race-neutral factors and policy
discussions). See generally Sonja B. Starr, Evidence-Based Sentencing and the Scientiﬁc
Rationalization of Discrimination, 66 Stan. L. Rev. 803 (2014) (recognizing that other
sentencing factors—such as employment status, education, and neighborhoods—can serve
as proxies for race and poverty).
223. See Gerald W. Heaney, The Reality of Sentencing Guidelines: No End to Disparity,
28 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 161, 175–208 (1991) (statistically analyzing all relevant sentencing
variables and ﬁnding the that distribution of average sentences varied from district to
district); Michael A. Simons, Departing Ways: Uniformity, Disparity, and Cooperation in
Federal Drug Sentences, 47 Vill. L. Rev. 921, 950 (2002) (noting sentencing guidelines
provide bounded discretion and prosecutors develop local practices within the guidelines);
Substantial Assistance Staff Working Grp., U.S. Sent’g Comm’n, Federal Court Practices:
Sentence Reductions Based on Defendants’ Substantial Assistance to the Government, 11
Fed. Sent’g Rep. 18, 25 (1998) (observing widely varied substantial assistance practices in
eight different districts based on interviews of judges, prosecutors, defense attorneys, and
probation officers); see also supra note 219 and accompanying text.
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phrasing of the different state criminal statutes.”224 An Iowan burglar
received drastically different federal sanctions than a Missourian burglar,
even though these sister states share a border.225 Burgling a building in
Iowa or Missouri carries very similar weight when judged on moral,
retributivist, or deterrent axes.226 Should the difference between
committing a burglary in Iowa, or driving a few minutes south to commit
a similar burglary in Missouri, justify the disparity of receiving a ﬁfteenyear mandatory minimum ACCA sentence? Should the difference between
possessing marijuana in North Dakota, or driving a few minutes west and
possessing the same amount of marijuana in Montana, justify the disparity
of being deported or getting to stay in the United States?227 These
differences in state criminal codes do not confer more or less moral
blameworthiness, or denote more or less danger to society, or carry more
or less chance of recidivism.228 Admittedly, a federal judge sitting in Iowa
may read the law differently from a federal judge sitting in Missouri during
the federal decisionmaking process, but this is true for all laws and is
inescapable. What are escapable, however, are unwarranted sentencing
factors, which can be changed and redesigned to bring the imposition of
federal sanctions closer to achieving uniform sanctioning outcomes.
Where an offender commits a state crime is simply not relevant to how
the federal government should impose sanctions.229 To be fair, states do
indeed weigh moral decisions when drafting their criminal laws;230 but the
224. United States v. Chapman, 866 F.3d 129, 137 (3d Cir. 2017) (Jordan, J.,
concurring).
225. See supra notes 16–24, 106–114 and accompanying text.
226. But see Jain & Warren, supra note 35, at 150 (arguing that such disparities are
warranted because they are similar to conduct in different states, which are being punished
differently).
227. See Gerbier v. Holmes, 280 F.3d 297, 312 (3d Cir. 2002) (“[A]n alien in one state
might be ineligible for cancellation of removal even though he committed the same exact
crime as an alien in a different state, simply because the two states punish the same crime
differently.”).
228. See Eric S. Fish, The Paradox of Criminal History, Cardozo L. Rev. (forthcoming)
(manuscript at 7), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3441458 (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law
Review) (noting the arbitrariness of using the categorical approach to impose collateral
consequences, which “makes the system a mineﬁeld that destroys some and spares others,
while failing to give the people it processes any morally coherent account of why one must
suffer a greater punishment than another”).
229. See Logan, Contingent Constitutionalism, supra note 26, at 163–64 (recognizing
the unfairness of making federal law applicable to the entire nation, while actually having
the application of federal law based upon the “particular geographic location” in which that
law is triggered).
230. See Joshua M. Divine, Statutory Federalism and Criminal Law, 106 Va. L. Rev. 127,
189–90 (2020) (discussing how variations in state law often result from preferences of
states); Logan, Creating a “Hydra in Government,” supra note 218, at 98 (noting the
“embedding of state preferences into the federal criminal law”); see also Hobson, supra
note 207, at 40 (arguing that states should have the freedom to choose what punishments
are proportional to a particular state crime because such a process reﬂects the “moral
priorities and [the] sense of justice in the community”).
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various applications and disparate outcomes produced by the categorical
approach can change on morally irrelevant differences in states’ scrivener
draftsmanship.231 This is not a morally relevant factor that justiﬁes
sanctioning disparities; neither does it serve as a reliable proxy for other
relevant factors such as continued dangerousness to the community,
recidivism, or the ability to reintegrate into society.232 So even when
measuring the disparate outcomes, the categorical approach has been
found wanting because geographical disparities are unwarranted as a
matter of predictability, efficiency, and morality.
C.

Nationwide Uniformity and Its Tensions with Federalism

Establishing nationwide uniformity, whether it be of application or
outcomes, is difficult against the backdrop of federalism. One of the
foundational principles of United States federalism is the diffusion of
power among separate sovereigns to prevent a tyrannical central
government.233 Federalism is the political reality that makes uniformity
under the current elements-based categorical approach unachievable.
And the Court has recognized this in different contexts, calling
“[n]onuniformity . . . an unavoidable reality in a federalist system.”234 As
long as different states continue to deﬁne their criminal laws differently—
which is a necessary part of the United States’ system of government—
uniformity will not and cannot be achieved under the status quo.
There are a variety of different federalism relationships between
federal, state, and local actors that each come with unique beneﬁts and
detriments. In some policy areas, federal and state governments can work
together cooperatively to achieve mutually beneﬁcial policy goals when the
sovereigns’ respective powers overlap, such as in criminal law and the war

231. See, e.g., supra notes 101–103, 137–147 and accompanying text.
232. See Schulhofer, supra note 221, at 835 (noting that Congress did not seek to end
disparities but merely those that were unjustiﬁed because they did not have any “real
differences in culpability or other penologically relevant factors”).
233. See Logan, Contingent Constitutionalism, supra note 26, at 146 (describing
federalism as “the decentralizing effect of which preserves the authority of national political
subunits to enact and enforce laws, especially relative to police power”).
234. Danforth v. Minnesota, 552 U.S. 264, 280 (2008) (describing nonuniformity in the
context of the application of federal criminal procedure rules based on variances of state
law).
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on drugs,235 immigration policy,236 and national security,237 to name just a
few. In other areas, there remains tension between the sovereigns
competing for powers, sometimes undermining each other rather than
cooperating for political and/or economic purposes.238
These traditional interactions between federal and state sovereigns
are different from what we observe in the ACCA, the INA, and other
statutes in which the courts utilize the categorical approach. There is no
interaction, negotiation, or participation in joint or competitive ventures
between federal and state actors. Instead, the federal government,
through Congress and the courts, unilaterally established its own criteria
for imposing federal sanctions that are triggered by state crimes. This
unique incorporation of state law predicates into federal law creates a
unique type of federalism interaction.239
This is the unique uniformity problem created by this federalism
interaction. The same sovereign applies the categorical approach
differently at the federal-proceeding stage based on the different
235. See Michelle Alexander, The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in the Age of
Colorblindness 49–55 (2010) (recording the billions of dollars the federal government gave
to states to incentivize them to increase drug enforcement); John F. Pfaff, Locked In: The
True Causes of Mass Incarceration and How to Achieve Real Reform 102 (2017) (detailing
nearly thirty-eight billion dollars given from the federal government to states to fund
criminal justice enforcement and detention); Rachel E. Barkow, Our Federal System of
Sentencing, 58 Stan. L. Rev. 119, 129–30 (2005) (“The [Violent Crime Control and Law
Enforcement] Act provided incentive grants to states that adopted truth-in-sentencing
policies that required certain offenders to serve not less than eighty-ﬁve percent of their
prison sentences.”); Reitz, supra note 207, at 117 (detailing how the Violent Crime Control
and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 was “tied [to] billions of dollars of funding for state prison
construction” if the states implemented truth-in-sentencing laws and redesigned state
sentencing structures to look more like the Federal Sentencing Guidelines).
236. See 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g) (2018) (authorizing the DOJ to enter cooperative
agreements to deputize states to enforce federal immigration policy); Peter J. Spiro,
Federalism and Immigration: Models and Trends, 53 Int’l Soc. Sci. J. 67, 67–68 (2001)
(discussing the general trend of federations moving toward a cooperative federalism model
in allowing subnational member states as partners in immigration policy and enforcement).
237. See Samuel H. Clovis, Jr., Federalism, Homeland Security and National
Preparedness: A Case Study in the Development of Public Policy, Homeland Sec. Affs., Oct.
2006, at 1, 5–9 (applying cooperative, competitive, and coercive theories of federalism to
national security in how states can affect preparedness in national emergencies).
238. See, e.g., Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Heather K. Gerken, Uncooperative Federalism,
118 Yale L.J. 1256, 1271–80 (2009) (discussing the power that states have as “servants” to
implement federal policies, which can be used to undermine federal policy in favor of state
preferences); Robert A. Mikos, On the Limits of Supremacy: Medical Marijuana and the
States’ Overlooked Power to Legalize Federal Crime, 62 Vand. L. Rev. 1421, 1446 (2009)
(exploring the relationship between preemption and anticommandeering doctrines in the
context of regulating marijuana).
239. See Divine, supra note 230, at 134–37 (describing how “dynamic incorporation” of
state law into federal law provides states with the power to exercise sovereignty and inﬂuence
the application of federal law according to state preferences); Logan, Creating a “Hydra in
Government,” supra note 218, at 74 (criticizing the merits of federal law’s incorporation of
state law due to disparities created by differences in state law).
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sovereigns involved at the state-proceeding stage; and the same sovereign
imposes different sanctioning outcomes based on the different sovereigns
involved at the state-proceeding stage.
The practical hurdles to achieving real uniformity in a federal system
have prompted other scholars to consider the value of uniformity, and
whether it is still a desirable policy goal. Given the immense variables at
play in the criminal justice system, Bowers has called genuine uniformity
“illusory.”240 Professor Michael O’Hear has argued that perhaps
uniformity has “run its course,”241 and others have commented that the
alternative of nonuniformity in a federal system is not “all that
troubling.”242 After all, the beneﬁts that ﬂow from predictability and
efficiency can still be achieved on a jurisdiction-by-jurisdiction basis as long
as separate jurisdictions have clearly deﬁned rules that are consistently
applied.243 So even if there is a sweeping federal law being applied, like
Title VII or the Bankruptcy Code, each federal and/or state jurisdiction
will have clearly deﬁned rules for application, and can achieve uniform
outcomes without unwarranted disparities in treatment.244
But for all the reasons stated above, federal sanctioning statutes like
the ACCA and INA cannot enjoy this uniformity because of the categorical
approach’s reliance on state law. Different state laws will always be
incorporated in these statutes. While other forms of federalism may
indeed embrace disparate outcomes based on the different sovereigns
involved, or may achieve uniform outcomes based on piecemeal
applications of federal law, such disparities in criminal justice call for
special vigilance. The diffusion of power in a federal system was in part
designed to prevent the unilateral and tyrannical consolidation of power
that threatened individual liberty.245 This is especially true in criminal
justice and immigration since the liberty at stake is the government putting
a person in a cage, or banishing them from the land.246 In addition, the
240. See Bowers, supra note 209, at 1675.
241. See O’Hear, supra note 192, at 816 (examining if uniformity is a worthwhile goal
given many different competing theories of uniformity in criminal justice).
242. See Frost, supra note 39, at 1606; see also Divine, supra note 230, at 188–90
(explaining that some regional variation can be beneﬁcial).
243. Frost, supra note 39, at 1606.
244. Id. (arguing that piecemeal uniformity within certain regions, federal circuits, or
states in respective applications of federal law can still provide beneﬁts of predictability and
efficiency provided each jurisdiction has clearly deﬁned rules).
245. See Erwin Chemerinsky, The Values of Federalism, 47 Fla. L. Rev. 499, 525 (1995)
[hereinafter Chemerinsky, The Values of Federalism] (noting that the diffusion of power
to states is often cited as one of the primary goals of federalism to protect “citizen[s] against
governmental oppression—the ‘tyranny’ that the Framers were so concerned about”
(quoting Andrzej Rapaczynski, From Sovereignty to Process: The Jurisprudence of
Federalism After Garcia, 1985 Sup. Ct. Rev. 341, 380)); Barry Friedman, Valuing Federalism,
82 Minn. L. Rev. 317, 402–05 (1997) (arguing similar theoretical and pragmatic beneﬁts of
federalism).
246. See supra note 207 and accompanying text.
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detrimental emotional and economic impacts that ripple out from
separating human beings from their families and communities cannot be
understated, and may have more generational impact than any other area
of federal law.
III. THE CATEGORICAL APPROACH AND MANY PATHS FORWARD
“When you come to a fork in the road, take it.” 247
As the Court has accepted, “whether for good or for ill, the elementsbased approach remains the law.”248 And as one appellate judge pleaded,
“Heaven help us.”249 His colleague on the bench, however, stated that he
would “be satisﬁed” with a lower authority “if Congress or the Supreme
Court would help us.”250 With the rising tensions in the legal ﬁeld that
question the continued injustices of mass incarceration251 and mass
deportation,252 and a number of upcoming cases addressing the
categorical approach before the Court,253 now is the time to pave a new
path forward. After discussing the nonuniformity of the categorical
approach in practice, and determining that the categorical approach also
fails to deliver any of the theoretical goals of uniformity, we must consider
the most effective avenues toward reform.
Scholars and judges have considered various avenues to reform the
categorical approach, and even more broadly the existing state-to-federal
sanctioning system. Many advance meritorious arguments that the
categorical approach can be ﬁxed through legislative means.254
Commentators that forward these solutions often blame Congress’s poor
247. See Yogi Berra, The Yogi Book: I Really Didn’t Say Everything I Said! 64 (1998).
248. Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243, 2257 (2016).
249. United States v. McCollum, 885 F.3d 300, 314 (4th Cir. 2018) (Wilkinson, J.,
dissenting).
250. Id. at 309 (Traxler, J., concurring).
251. See supra note 235 and accompanying text.
252. See generally Daniel E. Martínez, Jeremy Slack & Ricardo Martínez-Schuldt, The
Rise of Mass Deportation in the United States, in The Handbook of Race, Ethnicity, Crime,
and Justice 173 (Ramiro Martínez, Jr., Meghan E. Hollis & Jacob I. Stowell eds., 2018)
(discussing the rise of a deportation pattern in the United States over the past twenty years).
253. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
254. See, e.g., Matthew Kopp, Erased: State Burglary Convictions as Violent Felonies
Under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 93 N.D. L. Rev. 425, 448 (2018) (arguing for the
redrafting of the ACCA); Shelby Burns, Note, The Johnson & Johnson Problem: The
Supreme Court Limited the Armed Career Criminal Act’s Violent Felony Provision—And
Our Children Are Paying, 45 Pepp. L. Rev. 785, 826–29 (2018) (arguing for states to redraft
laws to conform to Federal SORNA deﬁnitions); Zachary J. Weber, Comment, Mathis v.
United States: A Repeated Request for Revision of the Armed Career Criminal Act, 85 U. Cin.
L. Rev. 1235, 1254–56 (2017) (arguing for the redrafting of the ACCA and for incentives for
states to redraft criminal codes to conform with ACCA deﬁnitions); see also Aaron Lang,
Note, An Opportunity for Change? Aggravated Felonies in Immigration Proceedings and
the Effect of Moncrieffe v. Holder, 33 B.U. Int’l L.J. 523, 551–54 (2015) (arguing for states to
redraft their laws to conform with federal immigration deﬁnitions).
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draftsmanship for the inconsistencies of the categorical approach.255 This
type of ﬁx would necessitate a legislative solution at the federal or state
level.256 Certainly if Congress amended the dozen or more criminal and
civil statutes that incorporate state law257—like the INA and the ACCA—
courts could abandon the categorical approach.258 Alternatively, if states
amended their criminal codes to track more closely to federal law—
perhaps if the federal government incentivized them as is common in
cooperative federalism policies—the categorical approach might become
obsolete.259 But any legislative solution faces tremendous political
hurdles.260 As Professor Rachel Barkow has highlighted, political
accountability often translates into ineffective policy in the criminal justice
arena.261 Democratically elected decisionmakers will continue to legislate
and exercise discretion to respond to community concerns that rarely
result in increases in public safety.262 And over the past decade, there has
not been sufficient political will to effect the type of drastic legislative
reform necessary to remedy the categorical approach.263 Using
255. See, e.g., Barkow, Categorical Mistakes, supra note 36, at 207 (“The blame for this
[ACCA] regime falls squarely on Congress and the statutory framework it elected to
adopt.”).
256. See, e.g., Ovalles v. United States, 905 F.3d 1231, 1258–60 (11th Cir. 2018) (Pryor,
J., concurring) (arguing for Congress to rewrite the ACCA to allow federal juries to
determine facts to trigger ACCA sentences), abrogated by United States v. Davis, 139 S. Ct.
2319 (2019); Evan Lee, Regulating Crimmigration 7–9 (Univ. of Cal. Hastings Coll. Of L.,
Research Paper No. 128, 2015), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2559485 (on ﬁle with the
Columbia Law Review) [hereinafter Lee, Regulating Crimmigration] (outlining the
“inventory approach” proposing that Congress create an exhaustive list of all state crimes
that could trigger corresponding federal sanctions).
257. See supra notes 45–47 and accompanying text.
258. Weber, supra note 254, at 1254–56.
259. Burns, supra note 254, at 826–29; Lang, supra note 254, at 554.
260. See Lee, Regulating Crimmigration, supra note 256, at 8 (explaining that “the
biggest obstacle to the inventory approach . . . is political” because it is politically dangerous
to appear soft on crime).
261. Rachel Elise Barkow, Prisoners of Politics: Breaking the Cycle of Mass Incarceration
1–4 (2019) (arguing that the political process has captured criminal justice policy, leading
to inefficient and ineffective outcomes).
262. See id. (“[T]he public and politicians react[] to stories or panics about crime with
ill-informed laws and punitive policies that extend far beyond the high-proﬁle event that
sparked them and without much thought about whether the response will promote public
safety.”).
263. See, e.g., Armed Career Criminal Sentencing Act of 2010, S. 4045, 111th Cong. § 2
(2010) (seeking to amend the ACCA to ﬁx problems of inconsistent application). The
ACCA’s original 1984 sponsor, Senator Arlen Specter, failed to pass this 2010 amendment
to ﬁx problems of inconsistent application. See S. 4045 (111th): Armed Career Criminal
Sentencing Act of 2010, GovTrack, https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/111/s4045#
[https://perma.cc/RF8X-D4PU] (last visited Aug. 25, 2020); see also Press Release, Tom
Cotton, Senator, U.S. Senate, Cotton, Hatch Introduce the Restoring the Armed Career
Criminal Act (Aug. 1, 2018), https://www.cotton.senate.gov/?p=press_release&id=991
[https://perma.cc/RJB7-UW3E] (describing senators’ efforts to reform the ACCA with
legislative changes). These reforms would base enhanced federal sentences on the term-of-
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administrative agencies as vehicles for change, such as expanding the role
of the United States Sentencing Commission in the federal
decisionmaking process, has also been advanced.264 But the Commission
has already been embroiled in these issues when deﬁning sentencing
enhancements and has not enjoyed tremendous success.265
Among the different institutions responsible for the categorical
approach, looking to the judiciary for a solution seems the most plausible.
As one judge noted, “[b]ecause the categorical approach often fails to
achieve the goal it was designed for, and because it is a purely judge-made
doctrine,” judges are in a unique position to advocate for and implement
change.266 A judicial solution is also the most efficient option. The
judiciary is the least cost avoider when considering the systemic change of
a doctrine utilized solely by courts. 267 In a handful of cases over the past
ﬁve years alone, the Supreme Court has drastically altered the application
of the categorical approach,268 and can do the same with one or two
strategic grants of certiorari. Further, because of the taxation of judicial
resources caused by the nonuniformity of the categorical approach, the

imprisonment of the state offense, and have been thus far unsuccessful in gaining traction
in Congress. See S. 1547: Restoring the Armed Career Criminal Act, GovTrack,
https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/116/s1547 [https://perma.cc/D8FA-E4R8] (last
visited Sept. 3, 2020).
264. See Thomas W. Hutchison, Peter B. Hoffman, Deborah Young & Sigmund G.
Popko, Federal Sentencing Law and Practice § 4B1.2, at 1357 (2014 ed.) (suggesting that
the Sentencing Commission could “alleviate” confusion by “providing a listing of which
common offenses are, or are not, covered by the [ACCA’s] ‘otherwise clause’”); Kupfer,
supra note 172, at 166–69 (arguing that a federal agency should be commissioned to create
a binding list of all predicate offenses across all state jurisdictions).
265. See, e.g., Beckles v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 886, 892 (2017) (holding that the
residual clause in the United States Sentencing Guide, § 4B1.1–4B1.2, is not
unconstitutionally vague); Press Release, U.S. Sent’g Comm’n, U.S. Sentencing Commission
Publishes for Comment Proposed Amendments to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines (Dec.
13,
2018),
https://www.ussc.gov/about/news/press-releases/december-13-2018
[https://perma.cc/9YKT-S6MD] (announcing a proposed amendment to the Guidelines
that would “enable the sentencing courts to consider the conduct that formed the basis of
the offense of conviction” in light of the “extensive litigation” and “inconsistent sentencing
outcomes” that have resulted from the categorical approach).
266. United States v. Chapman, 866 F.3d 129, 138 (3d Cir. 2017) (Jordan, J.,
concurring) (citing United States v. Faust, 853 F.3d 39, 60 (1st Cir. 2017) (Lynch, J.,
concurring)); see also United States v. Doctor, 842 F.3d 306, 315 (4th Cir. 2016) (Wilkinson,
J., concurring).
267. The “least cost avoider” principle posits that if a problem can be solved by two
parties, it is more efficient to place the responsibility on the party who can solve the problem
with the least amount of resources. See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property
Rules, Liability Rules and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 Harv. L. Rev. 1089,
1118–19 (1972) (assessing nuisance liability by determining the least cost avoider). See
generally Guido Calabresi & Jon T. Hirschoff, Toward a Test for Strict Liability in Tort, 81
Yale L.J. 1055 (1972) (arguing that the Learned Hand strict liability test often considers
which party is the “cheapest cost avoider” when assigning liability).
268. See supra notes 32–33 and accompanying text.
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courts are the institution with the most incentive to ﬁx the problem.269 But
while many judges and scholars have recognized the court’s unique role
to change the categorical approach,270 many of these proposals fail to
address its core problem of nonuniformity.
Fixing the nonuniformity of the categorical approach brings us to a
fork in the road. First, section III.A posits that if uniformities of application
and outcomes are to be salvaged, the categorical approach must be
appropriately reengineered to fulﬁll these goals. This section argues that
the most effective way to maintain the goals of nationwide uniformity of
federal law is to transition away from an elements-based categorical
approach to one based on conduct. In addition, uniformity might also be
salvaged by keeping the overlapping punishment between the state and
federal sovereigns separate. Section III.B, however, considers whether
uniformity is achievable and even desirable under our political system of
federalism. By considering this separate track, the elements-based
categorical approach can still operate as normal, but under a different
theoretical justiﬁcation: that of promoting the necessary diversities of state
law in a federalism system. This section also considers a different type of
nonuniformity by exploring whether statutes should be tailored according
to their speciﬁc intentions, with different categorical approaches for
different statutes. Finally, section III.C takes account of all of the above
analysis to consider whether complete abolition of the categorical
approach might be another viable option to move the imposition of
federal sanctions in the right direction.
A.

Salvaging Uniformity: Rethinking Criminal Conduct and Federal
Sovereignty

If the beneﬁts of nationwide uniformity of federal law are worth
preserving, there are at least two ways to salvage them in the context of the
categorical approach. First, transitioning away from the current elementsbased categorical approach to a conduct-based approach would ensure
that the variations of state law criminal elements would no longer impact
the imposition of federal sanctions; rather, a defendant’s underlying
criminal conduct in the state criminal proceeding would determine
269. See supra notes 166–173 and accompanying text.
270. See, e.g., Chapman, 866 F.3d at 138 (Jordan, J., concurring); Lynn A. Baker, Putting
the Safeguards Back into the Political Safeguards of Federalism, 46 Vill. L. Rev. 951, 961–72
(2001) (advocating for additional judicial review of federalism issues); Stephen Lee, De
Facto Immigration Courts, 101 Calif. L. Rev. 553, 597–99 (2013) [hereinafter Lee, De Facto
Immigration Courts] (arguing for more judicial discretion in the immigration context in
deciding whether to impose removal based on the severity of state law crimes); Steven G.
Calabresi & Lucy D. Bickford, Federalism and Subsidiarity: Perspectives from Law 5 (Nw. L.
& Econ., Research Paper No. 12-12, 2011), https://ssrn.com/abstract=1902971 (on ﬁle with
the Columbia Law Review) (arguing that judicial review is the correct enforcement
mechanism to ensure constitutional federalism continues to meet demands of subsidiarity
and to exercise judicial nulliﬁcation to counteract overly harsh collateral consequences).
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downstream federal punishment. Second, nationwide uniformity can also
be efficiently achieved by keeping the sovereignty of the federal and state
governments separate when imposing downstream sanctions. By only
allowing the federal government to use previous federal convictions to
impose downstream federal sanctions, this too would excise the need to rely
on the variations of state law in a federal punishment regime.
1. A Conduct-Based Categorical Approach. — A conduct-based
categorical approach is the most viable judicially implemented option that
would address the shortcomings of the current elements-based status
quo.271 And in terms of uniformity, a conduct-based categorical approach
could negotiate a compromise between achieving uniform application of
a rule across all jurisdictions, while producing uniform outcomes by
sanctioning similar criminal conduct similarly.
a. The Conduct-Based Approach in Practice. — A conduct-based
categorical approach would use a three-step framework that eliminates
reliance on state-law elements and instead relies upon an offender’s
underlying criminal conduct that led to the state criminal conviction. Step
One would remain the same as the current system. Courts would continue
to apply “uniform, categorical deﬁnitions to capture all offenses of a certain
[type] . . . regardless of technical deﬁnitions and labels under state law.”272
Consequently, applying uniform deﬁnitions of enumerated crimes
consistently across all jurisdictions retains all of the beneﬁts of uniform
application. To be fair, Step One would not be free of inconsistencies, nor
is it under the current categorical approach. Federal courts would, as they
do now, occasionally disagree on how to create such deﬁnitions273 and
continue to disagree on the elements to be included.274 These
inconsistencies, however, are not based on the vagaries of state law;

271. See Evans, Punishing Criminals, supra note 36, at 665–67 (arguing that a conductbased approach would lead to consistent results, save judicial economy, and solve
ideological problems); see also Thomas O. Powell, The Armed Career Criminal Act—
Proposing a New Test to Resolve Difficulties in Applying the Act’s Ambiguous Residual
Clause 8 (Mar. 16, 2009) (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review) (unpublished manuscript)
(arguing that problems of the categorical approach “seem to be easy to resolve if courts
could simply look at the facts and determine whether the defendants actually engaged in
any violent or risky activity”).
272. Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 590 (1990) (emphases added). For examples
of this phenomenon, see United States v. Garcia-Santana, 774 F.3d 528, 538 (9th Cir. 2014)
(creating a generic federal deﬁnition for “conspiracy”); United States v. Juarez-Galvan, 572
F.3d 1156, 1159–60 (10th Cir. 2009) (considering a generic federal definition for “kidnapping”).
273. Compare Taylor, 495 U.S. at 598 (citing Model Penal Code § 221.1 (1980); Wayne
R. LaFave & Austin W. Scott, Jr., Substantive Criminal Law § 8.13, at 464 (1986)), and United
States v. Fierro-Reyna, 466 F.3d 324, 327 (5th Cir. 2006) (“To establish the generic
contemporary meaning of an enumerated offense, we consider, inter alia, the Model Penal
Code, Professors LaFave’s and Scott’s treatises, modern state codes, and dictionaries.”), with
United States v. Alvarez-Jimenez, 151 F. Supp. 3d 1119, 1122 (S.D. Cal. 2015) (relying on
the Model Penal Code alone).
274. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
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instead, they are based on the vagaries of federal judges and their
respective opinions, which is an inescapable aspect of the judiciary.
Step Two would shed much of the current reliance on state law, and
instead determine the offender’s underlying criminal conduct at the stateproceeding stage. Federal prosecutors at the later federal-proceeding
stage would retain their evidentiary burden to present a record that would
support a categorical match between the facts found in the state court and
the federal elements established at Step One. There are a number of
different ways in which federal prosecutors could do so, including relying
on Shepard documents—such as a charging document or the plea
colloquy—to determine the conduct upon which the offender’s state
offense was based. For example, if an Iowan burglar admitted in their state
plea agreement that they in fact burgled a building, and not a boat or
airplane, then the conduct they committed in Iowa would qualify because
it comports with the federal generic deﬁnition of burglary. The same
would be true of a Missourian burglar if the prosecution uncovered
reliable records to prove the offender burgled a building. In cases where
the Shepard documents or other reliable records either cannot be
procured by the prosecutor or otherwise do not clearly delineate the state
criminal conduct, the government would be unable to meet its burden of
proof and the downstream federal sanction would not apply. Thereby,
criminal conduct would become the equalizer, regardless of state-law
elements.
At Step Three, courts and lawyers would do what they have been
trained to do since law school; they would argue and adjudicate whether
the state criminal conduct uncovered at Step Two satisﬁes each federal
element established at Step One. If the facts ﬁt the elements, the state
criminal conduct would trigger the corresponding federal sanction; if the
facts do not ﬁt the elements, then the state criminal conduct would not
trigger the corresponding federal sanction.
Admittedly, such a conduct-based approach will create its own
challenges and level of disparate outcomes. Different judges will ﬁnd
different facts from the state proceeding reliable, and will apply them
differently to the federal elements. But this is no different from the
warranted disparities in outcomes pervasive throughout the justice
system.275 Further, the conduct-based approach has already been in use
and proved effective in other contexts.276 Federal courts use a conduct275. See supra notes 221–223 and accompanying text.
276. Evans, Punishing Criminals, supra note 36, at 667 (citing similarities between the
modiﬁed categorical approach and the conduct-based approach); see also Shular v. United
States, 140 S. Ct. 779, 786–87 (2020) (applying the conduct-based approach under a
different section of the ACCA that refers to categorizing crimes “involving . . .
manufacturing, distributing, or possessing with intent to manufacture or distribute, a
controlled substance”); Nijhawan v. Holder, 557 U.S. 29, 40 (2009) (using the conductbased approach to determine whether a state crime met the requirement under the INA of
resulting in at least a $10,000 loss to victims).
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based approach in its three-strike jurisprudence and to punish certain
drug crimes.277 The Court has also determined recently that while the
elements-based categorical approach applies to certain provisions of the
ACCA and the INA, a conduct-based categorical approach applies to
different portions of those statutes.278 And as Judge William H. Pryor, Jr.,
Acting Chair of the U.S. Sentencing Commission,279 and this author have
separately catalogued,280 several states—including Indiana,281 Alabama,282
Georgia,283 and California284—employ similar conduct-based categorical
approaches in their own sentencing determinations.

277. See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 479 F. App’x 811, 819 (10th Cir. 2012) (holding
that the federal three-strikes law “unmistakably requires courts to look to the speciﬁc facts
underlying the prior offense, not to the elements of the statute under which the defendant
was convicted” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States v. Mackovich,
209 F.3d 1227, 1240 (10th Cir. 2000))). Fact-based approaches are also used in SORNA
cases, determining which state “sex crimes” trigger the federal requirement to register as a
sex offender. See, e.g., United States v. Hill, 820 F.3d 1003, 1005 (8th Cir. 2016) (examining
the defendant’s speciﬁc conduct to determine if it constitutes a sex offense); United States
v. Price, 777 F.3d 700, 709 (4th Cir. 2015) (applying the circumstance-speciﬁc conduct-based
approach to determine which state law crimes constituted “sex offenses” under SORNA);
United States v. Gonzalez-Medina, 757 F.3d 425, 430 (5th Cir. 2014) (ﬁnding that “a number
of considerations . . . weigh against applications of the categorical approach”); United
States v. Dodge, 597 F.3d 1347, 1355–56 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (using a plea colloquy
from a state crime to determine if it was a “sex offense” for purposes of imposing a federal
sanction); United States v. Mi Kyung, 539 F.3d 982, 990–94 (9th Cir. 2008) (concluding that
the court should apply the noncategorical approach to determine if the age of the victim is
relevant for the SORNA provision).
278. See, e.g., Shular, 140 S. Ct. at 786–87; Nijhawan, 557 U.S. at 40.
279. Judge William Pryor, Ala. L., https://www.law.ua.edu/directory/People/view/
Judge_William_Pryor [https://perma.cc/5GUB-ZJ6T] (last visited Nov. 6, 2020).
280. See Ovalles v. United States, 905 F.3d 1231, 1259–60 (11th Cir. 2018) (Pryor, J.,
concurring); Evans, Punishing Criminals, supra note 36, at 662–67.
281. Moore v. State, 769 N.E.2d 1141, 1145–46 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002); see also Weiss v.
State, 903 N.E.2d 557, 561 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (explaining that the conduct-based
approach used in Indiana is based on whether the underlying criminal acts of the out-ofstate conviction would have constituted a predicate offense “if they had been committed in
Indiana”).
282. Skinner v. State, 987 So. 2d 1172, 1175 (Ala. Crim. App. 2006) (“[I]n determining
whether an out-of-state conviction will be used to enhance punishment pursuant to the
[Alabama habitual-offender statute], the conduct upon which the foreign conviction is
based must be considered and not the foreign jurisdiction’s treatment of that conduct.”
(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Daniels v. State, 621 So. 2d 335, 342 (Ala.
Crim. App. 1992))).
283. Walker v. Hale, 657 S.E.2d 227, 230 (Ga. 2008) (holding that out-of-state crime
qualiﬁes as a predicate offense under Georgia’s recidivist statute if “the same offense, if
committed in this State, would constitute a serious violent felony” as deﬁned under the
statute).
284. People v. Gallardo, 407 P.3d 55, 57 (Cal. 2017) (holding that a California court
must rely on facts previously “found by a prior jury in rendering a guilty verdict or admitted
by the defendant in entering a guilty plea” when determining if an out-of-state conviction
would have been a predicate offense under California’s habitual offender statute).
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As these applications show, a conduct-based categorical approach can
serve as a pragmatic solution that also achieves uniformity of application
and uniformity in outcomes within the bounds of warranted disparities. By
excising reliance on state criminal elements at Steps Two and Three, the
vagaries of state law that the categorical approach was designed to ignore
are ﬁnally mitigated in the later federal sanction decisionmaking process.
Indeed, such a conduct-based categorical approach also appears to be
in line with the Court’s framing of federal sentencing goals in the
landmark case United States v. Booker.285 In the context of applying the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines, the Court stressed that “Congress’ basic
goal in passing the Sentencing Act[,] [which includes the ACCA,] was to
move the sentencing system in the direction of increased uniformity.”286
And further, the Court speciﬁed that such “uniformity . . . consists . . . of
similar relationships between sentences and real conduct.”287 This guiding
principle led the Court to declare the Federal Sentencing Guidelines
advisory, “while maintaining a strong connection between the sentence
imposed and the offender’s real conduct,” holding that such “a
connection [was] important to the increased uniformity of sentencing that
Congress intended its Guidelines system to achieve.”288
b. The Constitutional and Practical Viability of the Conduct-Based
Approach. — Commentators have raised doubts, however, about the
constitutional, economic, and moral viability of a conduct-based
approach. As a constitutional matter, the Court has long resisted a
conduct-based categorical approach because of concerns that it would run
afoul of the Sixth Amendment’s right to an impartial jury.289 The Court’s
interpretation and application of this right in the sentencing context most
notably started in Apprendi v. New Jersey,290 which held that “only a jury, and
not a judge, may ﬁnd facts that increase a maximum penalty [called for in
a statute].”291 Given this holding, jurists and scholars have argued that the
Sixth Amendment would prevent adoption of a conduct-based approach292
285. 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
286. Id. at 253.
287. Id. at 253–54.
288. Id. at 246.
289. See U.S. Const. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein
the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained
by law . . . .”).
290. 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
291. Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243, 2252 (2016) (citing Apprendi, 530 U.S. at
490).
292. See id.; Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254, 269–70 (2013) (“The Sixth
Amendment contemplates that a jury—not a sentencing court—will ﬁnd such facts,
unanimously and beyond a reasonable doubt. And the only facts the court can be sure the
jury so found are those constituting elements of the offense . . . .”); Taylor v. United States,
495 U.S. 575, 601–02 (1990) (ﬁnding that a sentencing court should look only to the
statutory deﬁnitions of a defendant’s prior offense and not to the facts underlying the
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because it would require federal sentencing judges to “ﬁnd facts” about a
criminal offender’s293 prior state criminal conduct that could boost their
sentence above the statutory maximum.294
But Apprendi and its progeny295 do not control the state-to-federal
sanctioning system.296 That line of cases triggers Sixth Amendment
protections in contexts in which sentencing judges act as fact-ﬁnders of
ﬁrst review when such facts are material to sentencing a criminal offender
outside of a prescribed range of punishment.297 Undergirding this Sixth
Amendment protection are concerns about the fact-ﬁnding process and
its entwinement with guilt and punishment. When fact-ﬁnders in the guilt
phase of a proceeding must make determinations beyond a reasonable
doubt, that guilt carries with it a certain prescribed range of punishment
under the applicable criminal statute.298 Therefore, to go outside of that
corresponding range of punishment based on judicial fact-ﬁnding at a
much lower standard of proof seems to nullify much of the protection of
the jury right altogether because the jury’s fact-ﬁnding of guilt is separable
from the corresponding statutory range of punishment.299 However, when
facts have been admitted by a defendant, or have been submitted to a jury
in a prior proceeding, a judge can consider such facts when sentencing a
defendant’s prior crimes); Sharpless, Finally, a True Elements Test, supra note 175, at 1295–
98 (arguing that Apprendi prevents a purely conduct-based approach); Sharpless, Toward a
True Categorical Elements Test, supra note 35, at 1024–28 (same).
293. This protection would only extend to criminal federal court proceedings and not
to civil immigration proceedings. See U.S. Const. amend. VI.
294. Cf. Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99, 114–18 (2013) (holding that facts that
increase the mandatory minimum sentence are considered an “element” of the crime that
must be proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt).
295. Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616, 621–22 (2016) (applying the Apprendi rule to
judicial fact-ﬁnding in the imposition of capital punishment); Alleyne, 570 U.S. at 114–18
(applying the Apprendi rule to judicial fact-ﬁnding that can increase a mandatory minimum
sentence); S. Union Co. v. United States, 567 U.S. 343, 360 (2012) (applying the Apprendi
rule to the imposition of criminal ﬁnes); United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 264–65
(2005) (declaring the Federal Sentencing Guidelines to be advisory to prevent a Sixth
Amendment violation from judicial fact-ﬁnding used to enhance sentences); Blakely v.
Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 304–05 (2004) (explaining that determinate sentencing
guidelines must also submit facts to a jury to impose a sentence higher than statutory
maximum); Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 607–08 & n.6 (2002) (applying the Apprendi rule
to judicial fact-ﬁnding in the imposition of capital punishment).
296. See Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2258 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (stating that Apprendi “does
not compel the elements based approach”).
297. See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 484–90 (2000) (explaining the history
of case law and analyzing the importance of the context of Almendarez-Torres, in which the
facts necessary to enhance the sentence were admitted by defendant and not “contested
issue[s] of fact”).
298. Id. at 481–82.
299. Id. at 496 (noting the difference “between accepting the validity of a prior
judgment of conviction entered . . . [when] the defendant had the right[s] to a jury trial
and . . . to require the prosecutor to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and allowing
the judge to ﬁnd the required fact under a lesser standard” (emphasis added)).

1820

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 120:1771

defendant because of the reliability and constitutional protections that
validate the ﬁndings in the prior criminal proceeding.300 As the Court itself
recognized in Apprendi, “accepting the validity of a prior judgment of
conviction entered in a proceeding in which the defendant had the right
to a jury trial and the right to require the prosecutor to prove guilt beyond
a reasonable doubt” is vastly different from merely “allowing the judge to
ﬁnd the required fact under a lesser standard of proof.”301 As considered
in Almendarez-Torres v. United States, admissions made during plea
bargaining can be accepted when considering downstream federal
sanctions.302 Yet there still may be concerns about overzealous prosecutors
trying to uncover facts not contained in the state court record. While this
point is mitigated by discussion below on the economic exercise of
prosecutorial discretion, a rule to limit prosecutors to the existing state
court Shepard documents would assuage much of this concern. This rule
threads the needle between overstepping on prohibited judicial factﬁnding under Apprendi, while ﬁtting within the exception carved out of
Almendarez-Torres.
In the context of a conduct-based categorical approach, facts that
have been submitted to a jury or to which the offender admitted during
the state proceeding have sufficient reliability and constitutional
protections to be relied upon by a sentencing judge during a later federal
proceeding. Evidentiary rules, due process, and other protections at the
state level legitimize factual ﬁndings from that proceeding.303 And because
around ninety-ﬁve percent of state criminal proceedings are resolved
through plea bargaining,304 these facts underlying the state conviction are
300. See, e.g., People v. Gallardo, 407 P.3d 55, 59–65 (Cal. 2017) (holding that Apprendi
applied to protect a jury trial, but does not apply when jury rights are waived through the
plea-bargaining process).
301. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 496 (distinguishing Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523
U.S. 224, 230, 244 (1998)).
302. Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 247–48 (upholding the federal recidivist sentence
enhancement because the offender admitted that previous crimes were aggravated
felonies); see also United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 628–29 (2002) (observing that, by
pleading guilty, the defendant “forgoes not only a fair trial, but also other accompanying
constitutional guarantees,” including the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial).
303. Due Process rights have strengthened since the inception of the categorical
approach, providing additional protections for criminal and noncitizen defendants. See,
e.g., Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b) (requiring the court to determine voluntariness and the factual
basis of the plea on the record); Laﬂer v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 170–74 (2012) (extending
the Strickland ineffective assistance of counsel standards to erroneous legal advice given at
the plea-bargaining stage); Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 143–49 (2012) (same); Padilla v.
Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 366–69 (2010) (requiring defense counsel to properly advise
noncitizen criminal defendants of the potential immigration consequences of guilty pleas);
Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970) (holding that a guilty plea operates as a
waiver of important rights and is valid only if done voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently,
“with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences”).
304. See Frye, 566 U.S. at 143 (“Ninety-seven percent of federal convictions and ninetyfour percent of state convictions are the result of guilty pleas.”); Lindsey Devers, DOJ, Plea
and Charge Bargaining 1 (2011), https://bja.ojp.gov/sites/g/ﬁles/xyckuh186/ﬁles/
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often conceded in a plea colloquy and potentially in a ﬁnal judgment
ﬁnding guilt.305 So while Sixth Amendment protections may indeed be
necessary in a single criminal proceeding, they are arguably inapposite in
the context of separate state and federal proceedings.
But even if Sixth Amendment protections under Apprendi may not
apply, additional procedures can also serve to mitigate constitutional
scrutiny. For example, bifurcating federal procedures into a guilt phase
and a sentencing phase can serve this purpose. A jury can preside over
both phases and consider questions of guilt separately from facts necessary
to impose a heightened sentence. This procedure also avoids unnecessary
prejudice at the guilt phase of the proceeding, since the jury need not
consider any facts of an offender’s prior criminal convictions.306 Instead, it
would only consider and ﬁnd such facts during the sentencing phase to
potentially trigger an enhanced sentence. This added process, however,
comes at the expense of judicial resources and jurors’ time.
This discussion on the constitutionality of a conduct-based approach
and judicial fact-ﬁnding must also include considerations of how plea
bargaining might be affected. In the current elements-based system, state
prosecutors retain imbalanced bargaining power in a charge-based
pleading system. 307 An offender can only hope to negotiate a plea deal

media/document/PleaBargainingResearchSummary.pdf [https://perma.cc/DNE8-ASGR]
(“[S]cholars estimate that about 90 to 95 percent of both federal and state court cases are
resolved through [the plea bargaining] process.”); Jed S. Rakoff, Why Prosecutors Rule the
Criminal Justice System—And What Can Be Done About It, 111 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1429, 1432
(2017) (“In 2015, only 2.9% of federal defendants went to trial, and, although the state
statistics are still being gathered, it may be as low as less than 2%.”).
305. See Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 303 (2004) (applying Apprendi and
holding that a judge may impose any sentence authorized “on the basis of the facts reﬂected
in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant” (emphasis omitted)).
306. See, e.g., Conner v. State, 138 So. 3d 143, 151 (Miss. 2014) (holding that a
sentencing hearing must be separate from trial on the principal charge, but the facts at the
sentencing hearing still must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt). Indiana also separates
the indictment into two documents. See Lawrence v. State, 286 N.E.2d 830, 835 (Ind. 1972)
(“In the ﬁrst the particular offense . . . should be set forth, and this should be upon the ﬁrst
page . . . and signed by the prosecuting officer. In the second part former convictions should
be alleged, and this should be upon the second page[,] . . . separable from the ﬁrst page
and [also] signed . . . .” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting State v. Ferrone, 113
A. 452, 457 (Conn. 1921))). For an argument calling for postconviction hearings for every
crime to determine whether a particular conviction qualiﬁed as a crime of violence, see R.
Daniel O’Connor, Deﬁning the Strike Zone—An Analysis of the Classiﬁcation of Prior
Convictions Under the Federal “Three-Strikes and You’re Out” Scheme, 36 B.C. L. Rev. 847,
883–85 (1995).
307. See Andrew Manuel Crespo, The Hidden Law of Plea Bargaining, 118 Colum. L.
Rev. 1303, 1316–32 (2018) (outlining the prosecutorial tactic of “piling on”). See generally
Cynthia Alkon, Hard Bargaining in Plea Bargaining: When Do Prosecutors Cross the Line?,
17 Nev. L.J. 401 (2017) (outlining prosecutorial negotiation tactics in plea bargaining,
including threats to add charges, exploding offers, or threats to seek sentencing
enhancements).
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that requires admission to a lesser crime that does not contain elements
that categorically match a federally enumerated crime.
A conduct-based system would change this dynamic. The chargebased power that state prosecutors retain in the negotiating process would
still be potent, but less so when considering downstream federal sanctions.
State prosecutors at the state proceeding have different incentives than
federal prosecutors at the later federal proceeding; the former are merely
looking to convict the offender of a state crime, and are not so concerned
with including the perfect colloquy of underlying conduct. In fact, many
Shepard documents—such as indictments and plea colloquies—do not
outline the exact state criminal conduct at all, or do so sparsely.308 This
illustrates how little state prosecutors prioritize capturing such
information that would cut in favor of defendants. Thus, when federal
prosecutors at the federal stage seek to impose federal sanctions, they may
not be able to meet their burden of proof based on Shepard documents
alone.
A conduct-based categorical approach would also remedy an existing
problem by properly accounting for Alford and no-contest pleas, in which
a defendant in a state proceeding never admits guilt but merely accepts
the government’s ability to meet its burden of proving criminal elements
beyond a reasonable doubt.309 Yet another shortcoming of the current plea
bargaining regime is that such pleas in state proceedings can serve as the
basis for downstream federal sanctions because the offender has
technically been “convicted” of a crime without ever admitting guilt.310 A
conduct-based categorical approach would ﬁx this inconsistency because
without any proof or admission of criminal conduct in the state
proceeding, there can be no ﬁnding necessary to impose a downstream
federal sanction. Such a rule may encourage gamesmanship by criminal
defendants to enter more Alford or no-contest pleas by bargaining for
more state punishment in return for the future avoidance of federal

308. See Fish, supra note 228, at 20–22 (noting that the court in a standard criminal
case does not always record a “factually rich narrative account of what the defendant actually
did,” and sometimes state court documents will not be available or will be scant); see also
Lindsay M. Kornegay & Evan Tsen Lee, Why Deporting Immigrants for “Crimes Involving
Moral Turpitude” Is Now Unconstitutional, 13 Duke J. Const. L. & Pub. Pol’y 47, 88 (2017)
(noting that many documents outlining “real conduct” or “actual facts” underlying state
criminal convictions are unavailable or sparse).
309. See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37 (1970).
310. See, e.g., United States v. Mitchell, 743 F.3d 1054, 1066–67 (6th Cir. 2014)
(“Convictions based on Alford-type pleas can be predicate convictions under the ACCA if
the qualifying crime is inherent in the fact of the prior conviction . . . .” (internal quotation
marks omitted) (quoting United States v. McMurray, 653 F.3d 367, 381 (6th Cir. 2011)));
Harrington v. United States, 689 F.3d 124, 127 (2d Cir. 2012) (accepting an Alford plea as a
predicate for an ACCA sentence); United States v. Salean, 583 F.3d 1059, 1061 n.3 (8th Cir.
2009) (“Alford pleas are indistinguishable from other guilty pleas for purposes of [applying
the ACCA].”).

2020]

CATEGORICAL NONUNIFORMITY

1823

sanctions.311 But this practice does not seem particularly problematic if
defendants are trying to avoid harsh federal sanctions applied at a later
date. This is yet another plea-bargaining tactic that adds just a mite in a
defendant’s favor against the overwhelming bargaining leverage held by
the government.
It is true, as a practical matter, that few public defenders have the time
or resources to research and consider how a state plea deal will impact a
potential federal sanction; such a federal proceeding may never come.
Nevertheless, due process protections demand that state defense counsel
must advise their clients of such downstream federal sanctions.312
Offenders at the state proceeding are also likely to prioritize the instant
sanction from the state court, with little thought to the possibility they
could run afoul of federal law at a later date that would justify a later
federal sanction. Nevertheless, by placing importance on criminal
conduct, this is yet another bargaining chip that can be used by savvy and
strategic attorneys in the favor of defendants.
This is the robust nature of plea bargaining in the adversarial system.
Every change, every expansion of rights, every push or pull will get a
reaction from the opposing party until practices of both sides eventually
reach a new systemic equilibrium.313 A change to a conduct-based
categorical approach is no different. It arguably gives defendants at the
state proceeding more control over their potential destiny in a later
federal proceeding; but with such a pull, there will be an equal push by
state prosecutors to account for the power shift.
Judicial economy is another critique raised by commentators, often
arguing that a conduct-based approach will require federal courts to
conduct “mini-trials” in order to adequately uncover the criminal conduct
outlined in previous state proceedings.314 But there are many reasons to
believe that such mini-trials would be uncommon and might even lead to
an overall reduction in judicial taxation. The ﬁrst has previously been
mentioned in discussing the impacts a conduct-based categorical app311. Such is the case in many deportation cases; state offenders who are noncitizens
would gladly bargain to accept more state punishment in exchange for the prosecution not
challenging an Alford plea so that they can avoid the even harsher federal sanction of
deportation. See, e.g., Lee v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 1958, 1961 (2017) (noting that more
state defendants will choose to go to trial and throw a “Hail Mary” if there is the chance of
success to avoid a downstream federal sanction of deportation).
312. See supra note 303 and accompanying text.
313. See, e.g., Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 373 (2010) (noting the interplay of
negotiation in the plea-bargaining process, and that new rights and considerations in the
process can cut for or against either adversary—sometimes based on counsel “creativ[ity]”).
314. See Das, supra note 124, at 1738–39 (arguing that the categorical approach
promotes judicial efficiency); Koh, The Whole Better than the Sum, supra note 35, at 295–
99 (observing that the categorical approach relieves the burden of “individualized
factﬁnding” and promotes efficiency); Sharpless, Toward a True Categorical Elements Test,
supra note 35, at 1032–34 (discussing how the categorical analysis avoids “mini-trials” and
thereby increases efficiency).
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roach would have on state and, later, federal plea bargaining. Plea
bargaining presents far from a perfectly reliable record of state criminal
conduct,315 but, for most cases, would give federal prosecutors enough
reliable evidence of conduct to meet their burden of proof.
In the relatively rare federal proceedings in which an offender
contests state criminal conduct, heightened burdens on the prosecution
to procure adequate records may result in an economic exercise of
prosecutorial discretion. If a rational federal prosecutor is assessing his or
her chances of successfully imposing a federal sanction, a lack of evidence
will often result in prosecutorial discretion not to seek the sanction in the
ﬁrst place or to abandon efforts to impose the sanction.316 The change to
a conduct-based categorical approach would place a heightened
evidentiary burden on federal prosecutors, as well as require additional
prosecutorial resources to track down the necessary documents or
witnesses to support a federal sanction; as a matter of practice, this will
often be more difficult for line prosecutors than the current elementsbased categorical approach that only requires ﬁnding a record of
conviction. Whereas a record of a state conviction is relatively easy to ﬁnd,
the corresponding record of actual criminal conduct is not.317
As in most criminal cases, the tremendous prosecutorial resources
required to sustain a trial—or in this case, even a “mini-trial”—would give
offenders more leverage and bargaining power.318 Even the threat of
asserting an offender’s right to a “mini-trial” may be enough to prevent
overzealous prosecutors from pursuing unnecessary or unjust downstream
federal sanctions.
Finally, all of these arguments are strengthened in the context of the
status quo, which already unnecessarily taxes judicial economy. Judges and

315. See generally Thea Johnson, Fictional Pleas, 94 Ind. L.J. 855 (2019) (outlining
several avenues in which defendants can plead guilty to crimes and conduct that are not
accurate reﬂections of the actual facts).
316. See, e.g., Stephanos Bibas, Rewarding Prosecutors for Performance, 6 Ohio St. J.
Crim. L. 441, 442–44 (2009) (recognizing that conviction or case-processing rates are often
the most visible of the limited metrics available to assess prosecutors’ performance); Michael
A. Simons, Prosecutorial Discretion and Prosecution Guidelines: A Case Study in
Controlling Federalization, 75 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 893, 932–33 (2000) (discussing the incentives
of federal prosecutors, including prosecuting high-proﬁle cases, competing with other U.S.
Attorneys for favorable prosecution statistics, and maintaining relationships with federal law
enforcement).
317. See Fish, supra note 228, at 20–23, 30–31 (outlining the difficulty of determining
prior criminal conduct when compared with the ease of ﬁnding electronic “rap sheets” that
makes applying recidivist sentencing enhancements feasible).
318. See Scott Baker & Claudio Mezzetti, Prosecutorial Resources, Plea Bargaining, and
the Decision to Go to Trial, 17 J.L. Econ. & Org. 149, 166 (2001) (examining the
relationship between prosecutorial resources, plea bargaining, and the decision to go to
trial); William M. Landes, An Economic Analysis of the Courts, 14 J.L. & Econ. 61, 98 (1971)
(assuming that prosecutors maximize the number of convictions subject to budget
constraints).
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practitioners have acknowledged this for years.319 Decades of the practice
merit, at minimum, consideration that a conduct-based approach may not
actually impose a net loss in judicial economy. Rather, for many of the
reasons stated above, there is reason to believe it could actually result in a
net gain given the rarity of mini-trials and the economic considerations
guiding prosecutorial discretion.
Defenders of the current elements-based categorical approach
acknowledge that their support is in part based on what they prefer in
terms of normative outcomes; practitioners and scholars who are
esteemed members of the defense bar recognize that oftentimes an
elements-based categorical approach breaks in favor of their clients.320
While some may believe that relying more heavily on state criminal
conduct would result in federal courts applying more federal sanctions,
such a claim has never been empirically studied or supported. Instead,
such evidence is largely anecdotal or based on practitioners’ general
experiences.321 Accordingly, a conduct-based approach has potential to
expand rights and yield beneﬁcial outcomes for defendants when
compared to the status quo.
2. Uniformity Through a Separate Sovereign Approach. — While a
conduct-based categorical approach is the most viable path to salvage
uniformity, constitutional and practical scrutiny justify exploration of a full
menu of options, including a new sanctioning regime that keeps the state
and federal sovereigns separate. Under this approach, confusion and
disparate impacts would be mitigated by creating wholly separate
sanctioning regimes, where state sovereigns could impose downstream
sanctions based upon only their own state crimes, and the federal
sovereign could impose federal sanctions only based on its own federal
crimes. The current state-to-federal sanctioning regime would be no more;
instead, it would be replaced by state-to-state and federal-to-federal
sanctioning regimes.
This reconﬁguration could operate under either an elements-based
or conduct-based system; the value is not between elements or conduct but
arises out of eliminating federal reliance on the varieties of state law. And
while the conduct-based categorical approach does so in a more efficient

319. See supra notes 164–173 and accompanying text.
320. See United States v. Doctor, 842 F.3d 306, 316 (4th Cir. 2016) (Wilkinson, J.,
concurring) (describing the categorical approach as a messy yet “particularly glorious goo,
because the confusion almost inevitably helps our clients” (quoting Steven Kalar & Jodi
Linker, Fed. Defs. Servs. Off., Glorious Goo: The Taylor/Shepard Categorical and Modiﬁed
Categorical Analyses 2 (2012))); id. at 315 (citing ten cases in which criminal offenses that
would seem to be covered by the ACCA’s “violent felony” provision—such as knowingly
discharging a ﬁrearm into an occupied building or raping a mentally disabled person—do
not qualify as predicates due to technicalities of speciﬁc state law elements).
321. See Lee, The Future of the Categorical Approach, supra note 22, at 269–70
(arguing that a fact- or conduct-based approach will increase the number of ACCA
sentences imposed on defendants, using Mathis as an anecdotal example).
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manner that could be implemented through a smoother transition from
the status quo, a separate sovereign approach could also achieve
uniformity by excising federal reliance on state law. A uniform categorical
approach based on federal elements or underlying criminal conduct could
continue; and while there will always be a degree of nonuniform outcomes
because of circuit splits or differences in federal sentencing judges, the
differences could be ironed out in the federal judiciary without carrying
the inherent nonuniformity necessitated by accounting for the varieties of
state law.
A separate sovereign sanctioning regime would require a signiﬁcant
dismantlement of the current system, but such a transition could
ultimately produce a higher ﬁdelity of uniformity than even the conductbased categorical approach. As mentioned above, the conduct-based
categorical approach still relies heavily on the reliability of court records,
which will inevitably cause disparity arising from how different states draft,
publish, and maintain such records.322 Because there will always be
indirect state control in a federal sanctioning system that follows a state-tostate or federal-to-federal dependency model, the only way to purge
dependency completely is to keep the interaction between sovereigns
separate.
The biggest impact a separate sovereign approach would have is an
extreme narrowing of the pool of defendants eligible for downstream
federal sanctions. Much of the rampant federalization of criminal law is
constitutionally justiﬁed through the Commerce Clause, which gives
Congress the ability to regulate crimes that might affect interstate
commerce.323 The Commerce Clause has undergone historical expansions
and contractions,324 but has always required some relationship—however
tenuous—with interstate commerce.325 For many federally deﬁned crimes,
this comes in the form of an interstate element of some sort, usually
requiring that whatever murder, kidnapping, burglary, drug possession, or
ﬁrearm possession crime be accompanied by some type of interstate travel
of people, goods, or services.326 But most crimes are committed purely
322. See Fish, supra note 228, at 21–22 (noting differences in state and local practices
of record keeping, electronic records, and the ordering process to obtain such records).
323. Gerald G. Ashdown, Federalism, Federalization, and the Politics of Crime, 98 W.
Va. L. Rev. 789, 790–91 (1996) (citing the Commerce Clause as the source of federal power
in the process of creating federal criminal laws).
324. Rachel E. Barkow, Federalism and Criminal Law: What the Feds Can Learn from
the States, 109 Mich. L. Rev. 519, 521, 527–29 (2011) [hereinafter Barkow, Federalism and
Criminal Law] (comparing Court decisions that expanded and broadened federal power in
criminal law).
325. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 536 (2012) (discussing the
general rule that Congress’s Commerce Clause powers are limited to regulating channels of
interstate commerce, persons or things in interstate commerce, and activities that might
substantially affect interstate commerce).
326. See Ashdown, supra note 323, at 802 (listing fourteen examples of federal crimes
that are based in part on interstate criminal activity).
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intrastate, which explains why states continue to dominate the criminal
enforcement justice system.327 As a result, the separate sovereign approach
would mandate that downstream federal sanctions could only be applied
to the small percentage of those convicted who committed federal crimes
related to interstate activity. But those convicted of intrastate crimes would
not escape due punishment; instead, such punishment would be left to the
state sovereigns to apply their own version of downstream state
sanctions.328
Some could argue that such a narrowing of federal sanctions defeats
the purpose of imposing them at all, since their primary beneﬁt is to
increase public safety by drawing on the criminal classiﬁcations already
made by the states. What makes state predicate crimes so impactful is their
sheer breadth. When comparing states to the federal government, the
former are far more involved in criminal justice and consequently are
responsible for approximately eighty-seven percent of the incarcerated
population in the United States.329 States have more law enforcement
officers on the ground enforcing their own state laws,330 and these state
agents are also sometimes federally deputized to enforce federal law as
well.331 By basing federal sanctions on state crimes, the federal government
creates an enforcement windfall by beneﬁting from the states’ expenditure
of resources and expertise in identifying dangerous people who should be
incapacitated and deterred.332 This could lead to a few reactive responses
from the federal government, such as greater enforcement of low-level
federal crimes to increase the pool of federal offenders, or even further
legislative expansion of federal criminal laws. But the most likely outcome
327. See infra notes 329–331 and accompanying text.
328. This would be especially impactful for immigration purposes. For over one
hundred years, the Court has preempted the states from deporting immigrants, or from
even denying immigrants certain rights and access to state resources that would incentivize
immigrants to move. See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
329. See E. Ann Carson, Bureau of Just. Stat., DOJ, NCJ 251149, Prisoners in 2016, at 3
(2018), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/p16.pdf [https://perma.cc/5UEN-ZW75]
(indicating that federal prisoners made up thirteen percent of the total U.S. prison
population, with states holding the rest).
330. Compare Brian A. Reaves, Bureau of Just. Stat., DOJ, NCJ 233982, Census of State
and Local Law Enforcement Agencies, 2008, at 1 (2011), https://www.bjs.gov/
content/pub/pdf/csllea08.pdf [https://perma.cc/P9J9-55R6] [hereinafter Reaves, Local
Law Enforcement Agencies] (reporting that states employ 251 officers per 100,000
residents), with Brian A. Reaves, Bureau of Just. Stat., DOJ, NCJ 238250, Federal Law
Enforcement Officers, 2008, at 1 (2012), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/fleo08.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6EUQ-TLYN] [hereinafter Reaves, Federal Law Enforcement Officers]
(reporting that the federal government only has forty officers per 100,000 residents).
331. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g) (2018) (authorizing the deputization of states to
enforce federal immigration policy).
332. See Adam B. Cox & Eric A. Posner, Delegation in Immigration Law, 79 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 1285, 1289–91 (2012) [hereinafter Cox & Posner, Delegation in Immigration Law]
(explaining the beneﬁts of the principal–agent theory in federal government, relying on
the expertise of private and public state actors in enforcing federal policy).
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also happens to be somewhat desirable; the federal government would
likely pursue fewer harsh downstream sanctions than it currently does.
A separate sovereign approach might also negate the beneﬁts of
public safety that federal sanctions were originally designed to improve.
Downstream sanctions in the context of criminal sentencing enhancements and immigration deportation are premised on the goal of
promoting public safety through retributive punishment, incapacitating
the especially dangerous, and speciﬁcally and generally deterring the
offender and others from the same path.333 These goals have stood as
stalwart justiﬁcations of the state-to-federal sanctioning system; certain
classes of those convicted of crimes should be eligible for downstream
sanctions based on their dangerousness and their inability to integrate into
society as law-abiding citizens. This indication of dangerousness to the
community is something that the conduct-based categorical approach
accurately captures, but the elements-based categorical approach and a
separate sovereign approach often miss. If a person commits criminal
conduct that indicates that they are a danger to the community or in need
of rehabilitation, what should it matter which sovereign punishes them or
whether state elements match federal elements of an enumerated crime?
For purposes of determining federal punishment, the jurisdiction of the
conduct should be less important than the conduct itself; crimes are
indeed just proximate measurements of dangerousness and a broken
membership promise to a community. Therefore, the federal sovereign
should be able to determine dangerousness based on the conduct of
crimes committed in and punished by the states.
While a separate sovereign system may bring us closer to uniformity,
it still remains less viable than a conduct-based categorical approach even
from an institutional standpoint. A separate sovereign approach would
require congressional action to rewrite over a dozen laws that explicitly
allow downstream federal sanctions to rely on previous state criminal
predicates. And in the current political climate, coupled with Congress’s
previous failures to amend the ACCA,334 there is little hope for such
legislative action that could be perceived as being soft on crime and carry
political backlash.335
B.

Accepting Nonuniformity: Promoting Federalism and Tailoring
Statutory Goals

While transitioning to a conduct-based categorical approach does
provide a viable path forward to salvage uniformity, nationwide federal
uniformity may not be a desired goal in the current national climate. In
333. See Schulhofer, supra note 221, at 835 (recognizing warranted sentencing factors
that justify a “real difference in culpability or other penologically relevant factors”).
334. See supra note 263 and accompanying text.
335. See, e.g., Barkow, Administering Crime, supra note 131, at 747–49 (linking
political incentives in the 1990s with tough-on-crime rhetoric and legislation).
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this vein, requiring federal sanctions to rely on state law may serve as a
check against a potential tyrannical federal government, which is
especially dangerous in the criminal and civil sanctioning contexts.336 This
check against central authority is one of the bedrock political principles
behind our federal system of government.337 If the status quo of state
variety is to be championed in the categorical approach, the strengths of
federalism must be embraced. Instead of “papering over” the rampant
nonuniformity of the categorical approach,338 courts could acknowledge it
as a necessary aspect of state sovereignty and highlight its beneﬁts. The
status quo can be maintained, but with the express understanding that
nonuniformity is an accepted cost to maintain a state-to-federal
sanctioning regime.
While embracing federalism would serve to justify the current
elements-based categorical approach and maintain the status quo, so too
could a more tailored categorical approach amongst different statutory
regimes. The ACCA and the INA are two different statutes with different
policy goals governing different segments of society. Such differences may
indeed justify thoughtful tailoring, potentially applying different
categorical approaches that are appropriate to fulﬁll the goals of each
statute. Under this experiment, it is likely that the state variety of the
elements-based categorical approach could maintain its place under the
ACCA in the criminal context where states have traditionally held sway,
but perhaps see change under the INA where federal prerogatives are
more salient.
1. Accepting Nonuniformity: The Federalism Benefits of the
Categorical Approach. — As long as state-to-federal sanctioning regimes
exist, there will always be a measure of nationwide nonuniformity because
of powers retained by the states and—sometimes more so—local
governments.339 So while nationwide uniformity is a worthwhile goal to
336. See Hobson, supra note 207, at 23–24, 26 (recognizing that states should address
crime through their own sentencing choices without the Supreme Court intruding upon a
state’s moral priorities in such choices).
337. See Robert L. Bish, Federalism: A Market Economics Perspective, 7 Cato J. 377, 380
(1987) (citing constitutional federalism as a solution to restraining Hobbes’s Leviathan);
Chemerinsky, The Values of Federalism, supra note 245, at 525 (noting that the primary
goal of federalism is to prevent tyranny of the central government); Friedman, supra note
245, at 402–05 (exploring the diffusion of power to states as a check to prevent federal
tyranny).
338. See Wayne A. Logan, Criminal Justice Federalism and National Sex Offender
Policy, 6 Ohio St. J. Crim. L. 51, 119–20 (2008) (stating that “efforts to impose uniform rules
risk creation of a mere false appearance of uniformity” that merely “serves to paper over
this diversity” amongst states).
339. See Cox & Posner, Delegation in Immigration Law, supra note 332, at 1332–34
(recognizing that “immigration law in practice varies from state to state” based in part on
the categorical approach’s heavy reliance on state law); Heather K. Gerken, Foreword:
Federalism All the Way Down, 124 Harv. L. Rev. 4, 11–21 (2009) (discussing the ongoing
inﬂuence and importance of local and sublocal actors in the federalism power dynamic);
Logan, Contingent Constitutionalism, supra note 26, at 155–56 (discussing the inﬂuence of
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pursue,340 it still faces an uphill battle that may warrant keeping the
elements-based categorical approach under a different justiﬁcation.
The most salient justiﬁcation for maintaining the elements-based
status quo rests in the theoretical and practical beneﬁts of federalism and
its respect for state sovereignty. Diffusing power among different
sovereigns is an intentional design to prevent tyranny, protect individual
rights, promote community mores, and facilitate experimentation.341 Yet
in the wake of the expansive federalization of criminal law342 and the
plenary immigration powers of the federal government,343 there are more
and more overlaps of power that can produce cooperative results.344
Express acceptance of state power and inﬂuence in the state-to-federal
sanctioning system would only be a concession of an already obvious
practice.345
If federalism is to be the new theoretical justiﬁcation for the
categorical approach, there may be merit in going even further to fully
embrace state sovereignty. While federalism can be used to justify the
disparities that would come from maintaining the elements-based
categorical approach, a more efficient option may be to simply start over
and accept whatever the state label of a particular crime may be. As
discussed above, this “state-labeling” approach was considered but
rejected by the Court in Taylor, reasoning that such an approach would
local governments in the application of federal criminal procedural rights); Edward L.
Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, Federalism: Some Notes on a National Neurosis, 41 UCLA L. Rev.
903, 919–20 (1994) (arguing that the primary beneﬁts of federalism and cooperative
agreements would come from the local level). See generally Cristina M. Rodríguez, The
Signiﬁcance of the Local in Immigration Regulation, 106 Mich. L. Rev. 567 (2008)
(recognizing differences in state and local implementation and enforcement of federal
immigration policy).
340. See Das, supra note 124, at 1733–34 (cataloguing case law and scholarship
regarding the importance of the uniform administration of immigration law); Frost, supra
note 39, at 1580 n.34 (discussing Supreme Court decisions from various points in history
that reﬂect an objective of promoting uniformity); Larry E. Ribstein & Bruce H. Kobayashi,
An Economic Analysis of Uniform State Laws, 25 J. Legal Stud. 131, 138–40 (1996)
(discussing the perceived beneﬁts of uniformity among state law).
341. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Empowering States When It Matters: A Different
Approach to Preemption, 69 Brook. L. Rev. 1313, 1324–25 (2004) (cataloguing beneﬁts
traditionally associated with federalism); see also David L. Shapiro, Federalism: A Dialogue
75–106 (1995) (same).
342. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
343. For a discussion of these “phantom norms” that serve as the foundation of
immigration law, see generally Hiroshi Motomura, The Curious Evolution of Immigration
Law: Procedural Surrogates for Substantive Constitutional Rights, 92 Colum. L. Rev. 1625
(1992) (explaining why reliance on plenary power prevented constitutional norms in
immigration law from taking root); Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law After a Century
of Plenary Power: Phantom Constitutional Norms and Statutory Interpretation, 100 Yale L.J.
545 (1990) (detailing the difficulty of establishing constitutional limits in immigration after
courts have relied on the unmitigated plenary power doctrine).
344. See supra notes 235–237 and accompanying text.
345. See supra note 339 and accompanying text.
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destroy the stated goal of establishing nationwide uniformity in the
application of later federal sanctions.346 But if the ideal of uniformity is to
be abandoned, such a state-by-state labeling approach would no longer be
anathema. Given the tremendous inefficiencies exhibited in the
cumbersome and complex elements-based categorical approach,347 it is
likely judicial economy would beneﬁt from extending the inquiry only as
far as giving credit to whatever crimes a particular state deﬁned as
“burglary.” If an offender were convicted of “burglary” of any degree as
that state deﬁned and labelled the offense, then this state conviction would
qualify as a “burglary” predicate for ensuing federal sanctions. And while
Iowa may deﬁne burglary differently than its sister state of Missouri,348
giving full credit to the prerogative of states to deﬁne and label their
criminal laws as they see ﬁt would fully embrace state sovereignty in a way
that respects the diversity among states encouraged by federalism.
But accepting disparate applications and outcomes in state-to-federal
sanctions on the basis of federalism may be inconsistent with actual
practice. The beneﬁts of federalism primarily come from states and local
communities making conscious decisions on the rights and regulations it
bestows upon its citizens. The strength in this diverse patchwork of laws
comes from the actual consciousness of diversity. When state lawmakers
and local executives actively engage in the decisionmaking process to
consider moral, economic, and public health policies, they are serving the
unique needs of their communities according to state and local mores.349
But as Part I of this Article shows, disparate application and outcomes
under the categorical approach are not triggered by the conscious
decisionmaking process of these state and local officials; instead, these
disparities are often triggered by mere scrivener draftsmanship.350 Writing
a criminal statute in a disjunctive clause, cross-referencing another statute
that clariﬁes deﬁned terms, or the mere placement of an “or” can and
does create nonuniformity under the existing elements-based categorical
approach. Therefore, disparity based on scrivener draftsmanship lacks
much of the federalism beneﬁts that might justify disparity among states
making conscious and weighty decisions on how to deﬁne and punish
those convicted of felonies according to the unique community needs and
mores.
Another critique often cited when upholding disparity according to
the prerogative of states and local communities is the penchant for racism,
xenophobia, and discrimination within the justice system. Fear rightfully
abides when empowering local governments because local preferences
346. See supra notes 85–90 and accompanying text.
347. See supra Part I.
348. See supra notes 16–24 and accompanying text.
349. See Divine, supra note 230, at 188 (arguing that allowing for the nonuniform
implementation of national law may actually be the intent of Congress to promote variance
according to regional preferences).
350. See, e.g., supra notes 101–114, 137–147 and accompanying text.
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have historically been associated with discriminatory laws and their
application.351 Scholars have increasingly highlighted the repugnant racial
disparities and discrimination suffered by communities of color at the
hands of local law enforcement352 and prosecutorial discretion.353
Professors Richard Briffault and Roderick Hills, Jr. have also levied similar
critiques against localism, arguing that local power is often hijacked by the
affluent, or those living in the suburbs, and can be wielded to forward
nefarious policy outcomes.354 The unfortunate reality is that giving state
and local communities more power and discretion nearly always results in
increased racial disparities in the enforcement, application, and outcomes
of criminal justice. This would be no different under any increase in state
and local power in the state-to-federal sanctioning system.
This critique carries merit, but does not appreciate the opposite
danger. It would be even more problematic if such racism and xenophobia
were nationalized. Scholars have shown that when states and local
communities are constrained from regulating an area because of federal
preemption, these local concerns have been nationalized in political
debates.355 Local preferences can have such an uproarious impact as to
351. See, e.g., Amanda Armenta, Racializing Crimmigration: Structural Racism,
Colorblindness, and the Institutional Production of Immigrant Criminality, 3 Socio. Race &
Ethnicity 82, 82–84 (2017) (recognizing the role that immigration law enforcement plays in
criminalizing race for Latinx Americans); Johnson, Racial Proﬁling in the War on Drugs,
supra note 127, at 969 (arguing “that the racially disparate impacts of the criminal justice
system exacerbate the racially disparate impacts of the modern immigration removal
system”).
352. See Lee, De Facto Immigration Courts, supra note 270, at 591 (“Police forces have
embraced order-maintenance policing in our nation’s most populous cities. . . . This
approach to policing has met its share of criticism. Some opponents focus on its
subordinating effects on communities of color.”); see also Huyen Pham, The Constitutional
Right Not to Cooperate? Local Sovereignty and the Federal Immigration Power, 74 U. Cin.
L. Rev. 1373, 1400–01 (2006) (“[I]f local authorities start enforcing immigration laws
without proper training, they are prone to engage in racial proﬁling or other abuses of
authority.”); Michael J. Wishnie, Laboratories of Bigotry? Devolution of the Immigration
Power, Equal Protection, and Federalism, 76 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 493, 509–10 (2001)
(“[N]oncitizens, and especially permanent resident aliens, are indeed a discrete and insular
minority, one that unquestionably has been subjected to historical discrimination.”).
353. See, e.g., Jeffrey T. Ulmer, Megan C. Kurlychek & John H. Kramer, Prosecutorial
Discretion and the Imposition of Mandatory Minimum Sentences, 44 J. Rsch. Crime &
Delinq. 427, 450–51 (2007) (using a case study in Pennsylvania courts to conclude that
prosecutorial discretion led to people of color receiving more mandatory minimums and
being charged more often with habitual offender sentencing enhancements).
354. See Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part I—The Structure of Local Government
Law, 90 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 19–22 (1990); Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part II—Localism
and Legal Theory, 90 Colum. L. Rev. 346, 349–56 (1990) (warning against the dangers of
discrimination when giving local communities more power); Roderick M. Hills, Jr.,
Romancing the Town: Why We (Still) Need a Democratic Defense of City Power, 113 Harv.
L. Rev. 2009, 2009 (2000) (book review); see also Nestor M. Davidson, The Dilemma of
Localism in an Era of Polarization, 128 Yale L.J. 954, 976–78 (2019).
355. See Spiro, supra note 236, at 71 (recognizing that anti-immigrant bias at its peak is
usually “geographically concentrated,” but “[w]here central government control is
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trigger national legislation and executive action.356 Such is the dilemma of
the American experience: racism and xenophobia are so ingrained in
American ideals357 that they show up on both sides of a political argument.
They can be used to justify or argue against a strong central government,
and they can also be used to argue for or against a stronger state and local
government.
In some sense, the odious effects of racism and xenophobia in the
criminal justice and immigration systems are unavoidable because those
very regulatory systems were built on racist and xenophobic foundations.
Diffusing power to contain such loathsome policies to the local level will
at least serve to quarantine these cancers, and allow affected peoples exit
options to vote with their feet.358 There is no winning, no true escape for
minorities and people of color.359 Because many communities of color
and communities of lower socioeconomic status are often targets of
overpolicing, arbitrary enforcement, and increasingly false positive
identiﬁcation of criminal behavior, maximizing exit options to minimize
such treatment is key.360 Therefore, accepting these diseases as they are,
the best option is to quarantine the worst cases within jurisdictional lines
and expand options for minorities and immigrants. Racism and
xenophobia appear to be less problematic at the local level than
nationalized at the federal level.
exclusive, localised anti-alien sentiment is channelled into the central government, even
though it may not reﬂect national majorities”).
356. See, e.g., id. (“Two major bouts of extreme restrictionism in the United States, one
at the end of the nineteenth century (exempliﬁed by the Chinese Exclusion laws), the other
in the mid-1990s, can . . . be tied to anti-immigration politics in California. . . . California
was able to effect its anti-alien preferences through national legislation.”).
357. See generally Ibrahim X. Kendi, Stamped from the Beginning: The Deﬁnitive
History of Racist Ideas in America (2016) (cataloguing the history of racist ideology and
white supremacy from colonial times through the present day).
358. See James M. Buchanan & Richard A. Musgrave, Public Finance and Public Choice:
Two Contrasting Visions of the State 179 (1999) (acknowledging the “exit option” for
“individuals, as resource owners and as residents . . . . If there is an exit option, if there is a
chance to leave, this necessarily imposes discipline on those who would exploit [citizens]
through a political structure . . . .”); Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Federalism and Public Choice,
in Research Handbook on Public Choice and Public Law 207, 207–33 (Daniel A. Faber &
Anne Joseph O’Connell eds., 2010) (explaining exit-based justiﬁcations of federalism when
voters reveal preferences for different policies among different jurisdictions through
voluntary migration); Wayne A. Logan, Fourth Amendment Localism, 93 Ind. L.J. 369, 404–
08 (2018) (describing the promise of increasing exit options as a check against local
government power, but acknowledging the practical difficulties of exercising such options).
359. David Cole, Foreword: Discretion and Discrimination Reconsidered: A Response
to the New Criminal Justice Scholarship, 87 Geo. L.J. 1059, 1081–82 (1999) (recognizing in
the context of local law enforcement, “someone will always be the loser . . . and . . . the losers
will generally be those without effective political power”).
360. See generally Faye Taxman, James M. Byrne & April Pattavina, Racial Disparity and
the Legitimacy of the Criminal Justice System: Exploring Consequences for Deterrence, 16
J. Health Care Poor & Underserved 57 (2005) (identifying legal and extralegal variables that
contribute to the overrepresentation of racial minorities in the criminal justice system).
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2. A Different Nonuniformity: Tailoring the Categorical Approach. — Thus
far, this Article addresses uniformity in the context of applying a uniform
rule and producing uniform outcomes across jurisdictions; but there is a
different type of uniformity that should be analyzed in the context of
applying the categorical approach across different policy areas. While the
categorical approach is clumsily applied the same way across these two
different areas of law,361 there seems to be little justiﬁcation in why that
should be the case. Some judges have defended this as a matter of
efficiency,362 but many others in the judiciary disagree.363 For purposes of
further exploration of the full suite of options left for the categorical
approach, there is merit to tailoring the categorical approach according
to the unique policy and language in different statutes. And these different
approaches may indeed justify different approaches to uniformity.
First, we must juxtapose the interests of criminal sentencing with
those of immigration law. Criminal punishment theory is a robust area that
justiﬁes the sovereign imposing penalties and depriving those under its
jurisdiction of liberty based on a violation of law. Much has been written
on the dizzying complexity of theory justifying that punishment.364
Immigration law, on the other hand, has often been used as a tool to mold
national identity through various theories of membership.365 Since nearly
the founding of this nation, nationwide immigration laws have been used
to shape political, religious, racial, and economic identities that have
relied on excluding undesirables who do not ﬁt within what at any given
time in the history of this country was considered American, are unable to
assimilate to American culture, or are undesirable to be weaved into
American culture.366 Consequently, it is not clear that the different policy
goals of justifying punishment versus establishing national identity
through membership are sufficiently similar to justify using the same
categorical approach to impose downstream federal sanctions.
The federal sanctions themselves are also uniquely different. Long
has the Court strained to separate criminal sentencing from immigration
as a matter of punishment. While the federal and state sovereigns
imposing a penalty for violating criminal law is considered punishment for
constitutional purposes, the sometimes more impactful deprivation of
361. See United States v. Mayer, 560 F.3d 948, 952 (9th Cir. 2009) (Kozinski, J.,
dissenting) (explaining the application of the categorical approach across the ACCA, the
INA, and the Federal Sentencing Guidelines).
362. See id.
363. See supra notes 166–173 and accompanying text.
364. See DeGirolami, supra note 216, at 701–06 (outlining and categorizing the breadth
of punishment theories).
365. See supra note 152 and accompanying text.
366. See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, David A. Martin, Hiroshi Motomura, Maryellen
Fullerton & Juliet P. Stumpf, Immigration and Citizenship: Process and Policy 2–23 (8th ed.
2016) (recording the history of immigration laws motivated by political, religious, and racial
differences among immigrants).
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liberty imposed through federal deportation is considered a mere civil
penalty.367 Consequently, noncitizens facing deportation in immigration
court do not enjoy the same level of constitutional protection as criminal
defendants.368 Whereas both the citizen criminal offender and noncitizen
criminal offender often face similar state punishment in the form of a
prison sentence, ﬁnes, probation, and other deprivations of liberty, the
noncitizen faces the additional federal sanction of deportation, which is
materially different than the sanction of a federal sentencing
enhancement.
Further, the traditional scope of state and federal power in these
policy areas is different. While federal criminal law stretches back
centuries, the federalization of criminal law exploded only in the past
generation, with a large percentage enacted in the past ﬁfty years alone.369
And even with the exponentially increased involvement that federal law
enforcement has taken in criminal law in the past thirty years, the states
remain the primary arbiter of criminal justice.370 Yet in immigration, the
federal government has ﬁrmly established its unilateral power to deport
noncitizens for over a century, preempting such state action.371 The Court
has often stressed the importance that, in immigration law, the nation
speak with one national voice that signals one uniform national sentiment
on the treatment of foreign nationals.372 Traditionally, then, the states
have always maintained more inﬂuence over criminal justice and
sentencing, while the federal government has maintained its unilateral
power to deport under immigration law.

367. See, e.g., Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 730–31 (1893).
368. See Aguilera-Enriquez v. Immigr. & Naturalization Serv., 516 F.2d 565, 568 (6th
Cir. 1975) (setting the test for determining if the process is sufficient in deportation
proceedings based on congressional intent); see also Tupacyupanqui-Marin v. Immigr. &
Naturalization Serv., 447 F.2d 603, 606 (7th Cir. 1971) (holding that noncitizens have no
right to counsel provided by the government in deportation proceedings based on the civil–
criminal distinction); Murgia-Melendrez v. Immigr. & Naturalization Serv., 407 F.2d 207,
209 (9th Cir. 1969) (same).
369. See Barkow, Federalism and Criminal Law, supra note 324, at 523–24 (counting
over 4,000 federal criminal laws, with forty percent of such laws passed after the Civil War
enacted between 1970 and 1998).
370. See, e.g., Carson, supra note 329, at 3 (noting that the overwhelming majority of
those incarcerated are held in state prison systems for violating state crimes). State law
enforcement officers outnumber federal law enforcement officers by nearly six-to-one.
Compare Reaves, Local Law Enforcement Agencies, supra note 330, at 1, with Reaves,
Federal Law Enforcement Officers, supra note 330, at 1.
371. See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 382–83 (1971) (preempting states from
affecting certain rights of noncitizens); Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm’n, 334 U.S. 410,
420 (1948) (preempting states from regulating immigrant rights because the power was
reserved for the federal government).
372. See Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 409 (2012) (discussing the need for sole
federal power in the immigration sphere to speak with “one” voice for the purposes of
foreign relations).
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These differences in policy, sanctions, and traditional scope of power
require consideration of different approaches. In criminal sentencing,
imposing punishment according to social mores, coupled with the longstanding tradition and practice for states to maintain their power and
inﬂuence in criminal sentencing, favor a federalism approach. In the
context of a state-to-federal system, this would rationalize nonuniformity
in applying downstream criminal penalties based on the inﬂuence that
state laws play in the criminal justice system. But the long-standing federal
control over the immigration system and the unique deprivation of liberty
at stake, would rationalize a different approach in which nationwide
federal uniformity is more in line with the policy goals and tradition at play
in this legal context. This very well may justify different categorical
approaches: one that accepts nonuniformity when applying downstream
criminal penalties, and one that maximizes nationwide uniformity when
applying downstream immigration sanctions.
This interesting divide in tradition, theory, and purpose of the
criminal sentencing and immigration contexts leaves open further
questions for future work. But within the scope of this Article’s
consideration of different paths to address the nonuniformity of the
categorical approach, the possibility that the categorical approach should
be applied differently in these materially different contexts is intriguing.
And given the extensive and still expanding scope of the categorical
approach,373 this path of tailoring nonuniformity of the categorical
approach based on the legal context has wide implications that is worth
future scholarly attention.
C.

A Novel Reset

Yet another path forward that is worthy of consideration is to fully
abandon the categorical approach and the statutes themselves upon which
it was fashioned to interpret.374 This Article explores a panoply of different
solutions based on the policy goals desired moving forward. But as this
Article shows, there is no perfect ﬁx. There is no magic formula. There is
no one-size-ﬁts all elements- or conduct-based approach. And although the
latter provides the beneﬁts of uniformity in federal law, there is not an
immaculate solution that would be left unstained by countering policy
concerns. There seldom are in any area of the law that holds even a
modicum of complexity.
One such avenue would be considering these statutes375 as
unconstitutionally vague. Grounded in the Fifth Amendment, courts use
the void for vagueness doctrine to strike down criminal laws that are “so
vague that [they] fail[] to give ordinary people fair notice of the conduct

373. See supra notes 45–47 and accompanying text.
374. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
375. See id.
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it punishes, or so standardless that it invites arbitrary enforcement.”376
Some have found that the standard for unconstitutional vagueness is itself
vague, “devoid of objective tests.”377
Striking down the enumerated clauses of the ACCA, the INA, and
other federal statutes—for example, the statutory sections that list
undeﬁned state convictions like “burglary” to trigger federal
sanctions378—using the void for vagueness doctrine has merit. In Johnson
v. United States and Sessions v. Dimaya, both decided in just the past ﬁve
years, the Court struck down residual clauses in the ACCA and the INA
that based federal punishments on state crimes that involve conduct or an
offense that presents serious or substantial potential risks of physical injury
to another.379 In detailing some of the persuasive factors that indicated
vagueness, the Court cited confusion among lower courts to apply a
consistent standard in spite of the Court’s efforts to clarify.380 Therefore,
the inability of future courts to “impart . . . predictability” that should
come from previous precedent is an important factor.381 In Johnson, the
Court noted that after trying to iron out a workable rule—deciding four
cases in eight years on the subject—“the failure of persistent efforts . . . to
establish a standard can provide evidence of vagueness.”382
But while Johnson and Dimaya have breathed new life into the void for
vagueness doctrine,383 it is unlikely that this will expand into other areas of
the ACCA and the INA that list enumerated—yet vague and undeﬁned—
crimes like “burglary.”384 Courts have expressly rejected vagueness

376. Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2556 (2015) (citing Kolender v. Lawson,
461 U.S. 352, 357–58 (1983)).
377. John F. Decker, Addressing Vagueness, Ambiguity, and Other Uncertainty in
American Criminal Laws, 80 Denv. U. L. Rev. 241, 243 (2002) (describing the doctrine of
unconstitutional vagueness as an “I know it when I see it” test that lacks objectivity (internal
quotation marks omitted) (quoting Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J.,
concurring))).
378. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(G) (2018); 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) (2018).
379. Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204, 1211 (2018) (quoting 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a)(43)(F); 18 U.S.C. § 16(b)); Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2555–56 (quoting 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(e)(2)(B)(ii)).
380. Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2559–60 (holding the residual clause void for vagueness based
upon “pervasive disagreement about the nature of the inquiry one is supposed to conduct
and the kinds of factors one is supposed to consider”).
381. Id. at 2562.
382. Id. at 2558 (quoting United States v. L. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U.S. 81, 91 (1921)
(quotation marks omitted)).
383. See Jennifer Lee Koh, Looking Ahead at Vagueness Claims in the Immigration
Context Post-Dimaya, 48 Sw. L. Rev. 525, 528–29 (2019) (examining the ways the Dimaya
decision could impact immigration law going forward considering vagueness doctrine);
Kornegay & Lee, supra note 308, at 86–92 (arguing that the Johnson decision updates the
law regarding vagueness as it might apply to moral turpitude).
384. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(G); 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii); see also Koh,
Crimmigration, supra note 48, at 1133 (arguing that the void for vagueness doctrine
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challenges in the ACCA and the INA. For example, the Court has
consistently held, for over sixty years, that deportations based on the
enigmatic term “crimes involving moral turpitude” were not void for
vagueness.385 Given this precedent, there is little chance for a term like
“burglary,” or other terms with a more deﬁned scope, to be deemed void
for vagueness. While the enumerated clauses of the ACCA and the INA
are indeed vague—failing to give adequate notice to ordinary citizens that
results in confusion and taxation of lower court judicial economy—the
categorical approach as a set of rules does not rise to the level of
arbitrariness or “judge-imagined abstraction.”386
Another related avenue is to slowly degrade the harsh bite of many of
these statutes by applying the rule of lenity. Historically, vagueness and
lenity shared connective tissue since a natural avenue to avoid declaring a
criminal statute as unconstitutional was to apply the rule of lenity.387 This
tool of statutory interpretation is triggered when “an ambiguous criminal
statute . . . sets out multiple or inconsistent punishments,”388 or sets out
some other material ambiguity as to the scope of the law or punishment.389
In such a case, the statute390 should be interpreted in favor of the criminal
defendant for the more lenient interpretation.391 This canon is one of last
resort, and only triggered when a court applies all other traditional canons
of statutory interpretation but is still left with an ambiguous criminal
statute.392
supports the current elements-based categorical approach, and that the conduct-based
approach would be struck down by courts).
385. Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223, 231–32 (1951) (rejecting the void for vagueness
challenge to the moral turpitude deportation standard under the INA).
386. Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2558.
387. Id. at 2567–68 (Thomas, J., concurring) (describing historical developments of the
rule of lenity and vagueness standards); see also Hessick, Johnson v. United States, supra note
48, at 163 (analyzing the aforementioned Thomas concurrence).
388. See Rule of Lenity, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) [hereinafter Lenity,
Black’s Law Dictionary].
389. Moskal v. United States, 498 U.S. 103, 108, 111 (1990); see also Bifulco v. United
States, 447 U.S. 381, 387 (1980) (“[The rule of lenity] applies not only to interpretations of
the substantive ambit of criminal prohibitions, but also to the penalties they impose.”).
390. The rule of lenity also has application in the immigration context, although
technically the INA is civil in nature. See Immigr. & Naturalization Serv. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S.
289, 320 (2001) (affirming Cardoza-Fonseca’s immigration version of the rule of lenity);
Immigr. & Naturalization Serv. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 449 (1987) (referring to
“the longstanding principle of construing any lingering ambiguities in deportation statutes
in favor of the [noncitizen]”); see also Stephen H. Legomsky, Immigration and the
Judiciary: Law and Politics in Britain and America 156 (1987) (describing the immigration
rule of lenity as “[t]he most important rule of statutory interpretation peculiar to
immigration”); Brian G. Slocum, The Immigration Rule of Lenity and Chevron Deference,
17 Geo. Immigr. L.J. 515, 516–17 (2003) (outlining Court precedent establishing the
immigration rule of lenity to protect against the drastic penalty of deportation).
391. See United States v. Santos, 553 U.S. 507, 514 (2008); see also Lenity, Black’s Law
Dictionary, supra note 388.
392. United States v. Shabani, 513 U.S. 10, 17 (1994).
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One of the many criticisms of the rule of lenity is that the concept of
ambiguity is itself ambiguous, making the application of the rule difficult
to ascertain.393 Courts have generally held that even when a statute like the
ACCA or the INA bases penalties on undeﬁned terms like “burglary,” this
does not raise to the level of ambiguity necessary to trigger lenity.394 The
ambiguous standard for ambiguity to trigger lenity is high. The mere
“existence of some statutory ambiguity . . . is not sufficient to warrant [its]
application,”395 but instead there must be “a grievous ambiguity or
uncertainty in the language.”396
This high burden is staunchly protected by the courts, having already
been rejected several times in the ACCA’s and the INA’s jurisprudence. In
both Taylor and Shular, the doctrinal bookends of current ACCA
jurisprudence, the Court expressly rejected that the rule of lenity should
apply to construe ambiguity in the ACCA in favor of defendants. First, in
Taylor, the court found that the term “burglary” in the ACCA was not
ambiguous because it has a “generally accepted contemporary meaning”
the Court could rely upon.397 In Shular, the Court was conﬁdent that the
text of the ACCA left “no doubt” as to its meaning.398 Many circuit courts
have followed suit, routinely denying favorable interpretation of the ACCA
for defendants on lenity grounds.399
This Article, however, argues a slightly different point of nuance. The
statutes themselves may not be ambiguous, but the categorical approach
is.400 And while legislative reform can be fruitful to ﬁll in gaps in statutory
deﬁnitions, the ambiguity and nonuniformity of the categorical approach
may not be enough to trigger the rule of lenity. In short, both the rules
393. See Richard M. Re, Clarity Doctrines, 86 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1497, 1499–500 (2019)
(determining whether a statute is ambiguous is itself an ambiguous decisionmaking
process); Brian G. Slocum, The Importance of Being Ambiguous: Substantive Canons, Stare
Decisis, and the Central Role of Ambiguity Determinations in the Administrative State, 69
Md. L. Rev. 791, 806–07 (2010) (explaining the difficulty of consistently applying the rule
of lenity).
394. United States v. Walker, 720 F.3d 705, 708–09 (8th Cir. 2013) (quoting Chapman
v. United States, 500 U.S. 453, 463 (1991)); United States v. Pacheco, 225 F.3d 148, 153 (2d
Cir. 2000) (declining to apply the rule of lenity because the lack of a statutory deﬁnition is
not enough to establish sufficient ambiguity).
395. Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 138–39 (1998).
396. Walker, 720 F.3d at 708–09 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Chapman,
500 U.S. at 463).
397. Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 596 (1990) (citing Perrin v. United States,
444 U.S. 37, 49 n.13 (1979)).
398. Shular v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 779, 786–87 (2020).
399. See, e.g., United States v. Eason, 919 F.3d 385, 392 (6th Cir. 2019) (denying the
application of the rule of lenity when interpreting the ACCA regarding the distribution of
methamphetamines); Perez v. United States, 885 F.3d 984, 991 (6th Cir. 2018) (declining
to apply the rule of lenity regarding the New York conviction trigger of an enhanced
sentence under the ACCA because New York law itself was clearly in line with the
ACCA), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 1259 (2019).
400. See supra notes 166–170 and accompanying text.
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governing unconstitutional vagueness and the statutory canon of lenity
require a high level of statutory ambiguity, as opposed to methodological
ambiguity. And while the ACCA, the INA, and other federal statutes are
rife with uncertainty, the categorical approach as the method of
interpretation is the real centerpiece of ambiguity that may put both of
these novel resets out of reach for the foreseeable future.
While the short analysis here does little justice to these robust
doctrines, this is commensurate with the relative chance either avenue has
of success. Because the Court has rejected these arguments in the past,
there is little hope for judicial intervention along these avenues. But, as
the Court has said before, past experience in embarking “upon a failed
enterprise” can sway precedent.401 And in the rare case, it can serve as an
overriding factor even in the face of stare decisis.402 It took the Court nine
years of failure trying to create a consistent test for the ACCA’s residual
clause before it gave up in Johnson, for example.403 There is hope, then,
that the more failures courts experience using the categorical approach to
interpret federal statutes, the higher the probability that the judiciary will
abandon the current elements-based approach.
CONCLUSION
The categorical approach and uniformity can no longer be used to
reinforce one another. They are not compatible, and cannot be reconciled
without signiﬁcant revision of one or the other. Any state-to-federal
sanctioning system in which these phases are governed by separate
sovereigns will not and cannot achieve uniformity because of the respect
each sovereign must pay to the other’s law. The categorical approach is no
different, as illustrated by the ACCA and the INA. Committing a burglary
in Iowa will have different federal sanctioning outcomes than if that same
burglary were committed in Missouri. The difference between staying in
the United States or being deported can come down to the differences
between how states deﬁne respective crimes, or sometimes the differences
of an “or.” Such harsh sanctions should not be based on the morally
irrelevant factor of state draftsmanship; and such sanctions should not
produce these types of troubling disparities in a federal sanctioning system
that seeks to promote nationwide uniformity.
Opportunities for change abound, and such change would be broadly
felt. The categorical approach has a wide sweep and is implemented across
at least a dozen different federal statutes and similarly mimicked by the
states. And while the nonuniformity problems of the categorical approach
401. Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2560 (2015).
402. Id. at 2562 (“The doctrine of stare decisis allows us to revisit an earlier decision
where experience with its application reveals that it is unworkable.” (citing Payne v.
Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827 (1991))).
403. Id. at 2560 (“Nine years’ experience trying to derive meaning from the residual
clause convinces us that we have embarked upon a failed enterprise.”).

2020]

CATEGORICAL NONUNIFORMITY

1841

are perhaps most impactful in the sentencing enhancement and
immigration contexts, any change that ﬁxes nonuniformity in these
contexts can be readily exported to beneﬁt the larger territory governed
by the categorical approach. A conduct-based categorical approach
remains the most viable option to preserve uniformity, while abandoning
nationwide uniformity and embracing federalism principles remains the
most viable option to preserve the current categorical approach.
“It has been said that the life of the law is experience.”404 If the life of
the categorical approach renders any experience, it is that of a failed
experiment that falls under the weight of its own goals of uniformity. And
with several upcoming cases before the Court this term,405 and
undoubtedly in terms to come, the time for change is now.

404. Id. at 2560 (declaring the residual clause of the ACCA unconstitutionally vague).
405. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.

1842

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 120:1771

